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'Playola' and Fraud on Digital Music Platforms:
Why Legislative Action is Required to Save the
Music Streaming Market

CHRISTINE S MITH BURTON *©
Music streaming fraud has become a prevalent evil within the music industry.
Fake streams cost the industry an estimated $300 million a year.1 Unfortunately, the
existence of music streaming fraud is hard to establish,2 leaving insufficient proof to
prosecute or file suit. In April of 2018, however, Focus Media, Inc. filed a complaint
against Streamify in the United States District Court of the State of Maryland for
Streamify’s practice of music streaming fraud. 3 The Court transferred the case to the
Southern District of Texas due to jurisdictional issues.4 But, based on the analysis of
the Maryland Court, the case will likely be removed from litigation and forced into
arbitration.5 Neither the public nor the industry will have any further information on
how a United States Court may interpret allegations of music streaming fraud or if
Focus Media was able to produce enough evidence to establish a fraud claim against
Streamify.6
© Christine Smith Burton, 2021.
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author would
like to thank the editors and staff on the Journal of Business & Technology Law, specifically Michelle Sidle,
Zachary Birnbaum and Nisha Jain, for their suggestions, feedback, and support during the writing process. The
author would also like to thank Professor Nathan Robertson for his time, guidance, and suggestions throughout
this process. Additionally, the author would like to thank Marc Jacobsen for his invaluable guidance, and
Professor Patricia Campbell and Lucy Martin for their helpful final edits. Finally, the author would like to thank
Lee Burton for his constant love and support.
1. See generally Elias Leight, Fake Streams Could Be Costing Artists $300 Million a Year: As Streaming
Platforms Grow, Indie Labels Are Becoming Increasingly Concerned About How the Numbers Can Be
Manipulated, R OLLING S TONE (Jun. 18, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/musicfeatures/fake-streams-indie-labels-spotify-tidal-846641/.
2. See generally Amy X. Wang, Music Streaming Has a Nearly Undetectable Fraud Problem, Q UARTZ
(Mar. 15, 2016), https://qz.com/615359/steady-chunks-of-money-are-being-quietly-illicitly-stolen-from-musicstreaming/.
3. See generally Focus Music Entm’t, LLC v. Streamify, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205912 (Dec. 5.
2018).
4. Id. at *44.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Although it is unlikely there will be an official Court opinion in this case, the
subject matter in the complaint’s allegations, as well as other forms of music
streaming fraud, are worth examining from a legal perspective. There are multiple
types of fraud in music streaming. There are different types of third parties that have
manipulated the system to obtain financial gain by defrauding the music streaming
services and diluting the rightsholder royalty pool.7 Third party playlist pluggers
have been accused of using fraudulent practices to boost streams to generate higher
royalty revenue for their clients.8 In the Focus Media case, Streamify was accused of
obtaining streams for artist clients by deceptive practices like stream farms. 9 Other
third parties have committed music streaming fraud by creating fake artists, songs
and playlists as a means to defraud digital music platforms and obtain royalty revenue
at the expense of legitimate artists and rightsholders.10 Further, users have been
accused of downloading bots to loop particular artists’ compositions manipulating
the royalty pool toward a favored artist.11
There have also been allegations that music industry insiders, at both the artist
and label levels, have committed music streaming fraud.12 Artist managers have been
accused of using shady third-party playlist pluggers and bot farms to boost streams
to generate greater revenue in favor of their clients.13 Record labels (“labels”) and
artists have been accused of the same practice. 14 Artists have also been accused of
requesting fans to download bots to stream songs on a loop to drive more royalty

7. Cherie Hu, Fraud Has Become the Latest Hurdle for Music Streaming, V ARIETY (Aug. 16, 2018, 9:45
AM), https://variety.com/2018/music/news/music-streaming-sites-fraud-1202905665/; Glenn Peoples, How
‘Playola’ Is Infiltrating Streaming Services: Pay for Play Is ‘Definitely Happening’, B ILLBOARD (Aug. 19,
2015), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6670475/playola-promotion-streaming-services.
8. Peoples, supra note 7.
9. Focus, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205912 at *7-9. Tim Ingham, Forget About Fake Artists – It’s Time to
Talk
About
Fake
Streams,
M USIC
B US.
WORLDWIDE
(Jul.
20,
2017),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/forget-about-fake-artists-its-time-to-talk-about-fake-streams/.
10. Wang, supra note 2.
11. Matt Clinch, How the Music Industry Is Fighting Online Fraud, CNBC (Dec. 28, 2015, 8:55 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/28/how-the-music-industry-is-fighting-online-fraud.html; Lisa Respers France,
Fans Stream Nelly to Help Him Pay Off $2.4 Million Debt, CNN (Sept. 13, 2016, 2:47 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/13/media/nelly-debt-streaming/.
12. Peoples, supra note 7.
13. Tim Ingham, How the Music Business Can Actually Crack Down on Streaming Fraud: The Music
Business Is Fighting Streaming Fraud with a Pointless New “Code.” It Won’t Work – but These Ideas Will,
R OLLING S TONE (Jun. 21, 2019, 12:04 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/how-to-fightspotify-streaming-fraud-850990/.
14. Roderick Thomas, Rolling Stone Charts – The End of Payola?, STAR R EVUE (Oct. 1, 2019),
http://www.star-revue.com/rolling-stone-charts-the-end-of-payola/#sthash.4MIbWjs0.dpbs.
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income to a particular artist.15 When insiders within the industry manipulate streams
(or have been accused of), the practice has been coined ‘playola.’16
There have also been music streaming fraud allegations directly against the digital
music platforms. Digital music services have been accused of diluting the royalty
pool for their own benefit by creating their own songs and placing those songs on
popular playlists.17 Other digital music platforms have been accused of manipulating
streaming data in favor of certain artists.18
Unfortunately, in many instances of music streaming fraud, the fraudulent
practice may not be considered illegal. In fact, where fraud has been alleged against
the digital music services or a music industry insider, the practice may fall into a
legal grey area that is not necessarily in violation of any statute.19 However, these
practices may substantially decrease royalty payouts to legitimate artists and
rightsholders and, in turn, harm the consumer.20 This comment examines how music
streaming fraud may be prevented in the future and attempts to present the best
course of action that can be taken to protect the intellectual property rights of
rightsholders from music streaming fraud.
This comment addresses this problem in ten parts. The first section discusses the
basics of how the must streaming playlist operates.21 The second section explains the
music streaming royalty pool.22 The third,23 fourth24 and fifth25 sections discuss the
different forms of accused fraud allegedly committed by third parties, music industry
insiders, and the digital music services, respectively. The sixth section examines
current music streaming fraud prevention methods and industry speculation of why
little has been done to prevent music streaming fraud.26 The seventh section explores

15.

Clinch, supra note 11.
Peoples, supra note 7; Glenn Peoples, Modern Promotion & Playlisting: Beyond the Playola,
B ILLBOARD (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6678562/modern-promotionplaylists-handshakes.
17. See generally Tim Ingham, Spotify Is Making Its Own Records…and Putting Them on Playlists, M USIC
B US. WORLDWIDE (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/spotify-is-creating-its-ownrecordings-and-putting-them-on-playlists/.
18. Murray Stassen, TIDAL Now Officially a Suspect in Norwegian Data Fraud Investigation, M USIC B US.
WORLDWIDE , (Jun. 10, 2020), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/tidal-now-officially-a-suspect-innorwegian-data-fraudinvestigation/#:~:text=DN%20reported%20yesterday%20(June%209,since%20June%2021%20last%20year.
19. Peoples, supra note 16.
20. See Hu, supra note 7; Ingham, supra note 13.
21. See infra Section I.
22. See infra Section II.
23. See infra Section III.
24. See infra Section IV.
25. See infra Section V.
26. See infra Section VI.
16.
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why liability in the case of music streaming fraud is almost impossible to prove.27
The eighth section discusses the current industry solutions.28 In the last sections,
current legislation and possible solutions are examined and proposed.29
I. WHY THE PLAYLIST IS IMPORTANT AND THE IMPACT OF FRAUD

The music streaming playlist has become a prominent source of royalty revenue
for rightsholders.30 The music streaming playlist is a powerful promotional tool in
the music industry,31 as when a song is placed on a popular playlist, this placement
can almost guarantee that the song will become a hit.32 There are multiple types of
playlists including playlists curated by digital music platforms, playlists curated by
labels and playlists curated by independent parties (both commercial entities and
individuals).33 Top playlists can have millions of followers.34 These followers may
use these playlists to listen to music during the entirety of the day or use popular
playlists in conjunction with specific activities, like working out, relaxing, and
partying.35 Followers may also turn to playlists to listen to new music or music of a
specific genre.36
These playlists become especially important when a playlist has millions of
followers.37 Spotify’s playlist entitled Today’s Top Hits has over 25 million
followers and over 20 billion streams.38 Top playlists with millions of followers can

27.

See infra Section VII.
See infra Section VIII.
29. See infra Section IX, X.
30. See Peoples, supra note 16.
31. Id.; See Peoples, supra note 7.
32. See David Pierce, The Secret Hit-Making Power of the Spotify Playlist, WIRED (May 3, 2017, 7:30 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2017/05/secret-hit-making-power-spotify-playlist/.
33. Simon Owens, How Artists Illegally Pay Their Way onto Spotify’s Playlists, M EDIUM (May 7, 2018),
https://medium.com/the-business-of-content/how-artists-illegally-pay-their-way-onto-spotifys-playlists6b85ce0865c5; Robert Cookson, Spotify Bans ‘Payola’ on Playlists, F INANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 20, 2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/af1728ca-4740-11e5-af2f-4d6e0e5eda22.
34. See Spotify’s Biggest Playlist, Today’s Top Hits, Celebrates 25 Million Followers, SPOTIFY (Dec. 16,
2019) [hereinafter SPOTIFY], https://newsroom.spotify.com/2019-12-16/spotifys-biggest-playlist-todays-tophits-celebrates-25-million-followers/; Owens, supra note 33; Cookson, supra note 33.
35. See Pierce, supra note 32; Eric R. Danton, Streaming Success? How Some Artists Are Building Their
Careers
Through
Spotify
Playlists,
F ORTUNE
(Dec.
12,
2019,
12:30
PM),
https://fortune.com/2019/12/12/spotify-artists-success-streaming-playlists/.
36. SPOTIFY, supra note 34; See generally Glenn Peoples, Consumers Now Favor Streaming Services for
Music
Discovery
over
All
Other
Sources,
BILLBOARD
(Sept.
30,
2020),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/streaming/9457753/consumers-streaming-music-discovery-music360.
37. Owens, supra note 33.
38. SPOTIFY, supra note 34; Stuart Dredge, Spotify’s Today’s Top Hits Playlist Now Has 25 Million
Followers, MUSICALLY (Dec. 17, 2019), https://musically.com/2019/12/17/spotifys-todays-top-hits-playlist28.
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increase the number of streams, which in turn significantly increases royalty revenue
for rightsholders. 39 As millions of followers listen to their favorite playlists every
day, the streams for the songs contained on that playlist continue to increase. 40
Currently, a third of all Spotify user listening time is spent listening to Spotifycurated playlists and another third of this time is spent listening to user-created
playlists.41 These listening habits give playlists incredible importance as new music
or artists may never be discovered if their compositions cannot gain inclusion on
these playlists.42 Some major labels have claimed an artist a failure because that
artist, despite traditional terrestrial radio and tour success, was not “playlisted.”43
Many curators, whether through human or artificial interaction, depend on general
streaming numbers to determine whether songs are placed on some of the most
popular music playlists.44 In other words, music with demonstrated popularity is
selected for playlists, which then further increases its popularity. Companies, like
Spotify, have been accused as being more data driven, even in human selections, than
musically driven45 and have become increasing reliant on algorithms to make, or
dwindle, musical selections down for later human selection. 46 In contrast, other
digital platforms, like Apple Music, claim that playlists are, first, hand-selected by a
human curator. 47 Apple Music will then use an algorithm to distribute songs to a

now-has-25mfollowers/#:~:text=Spotify%20is%20finishing%202019%20by,since%20its%20launch%20in%202014.
39. Jacob Passy, How Spotify Influences What Songs Become Popular (or Not), M ARKET WATCH (Jun. 18,
2018, 2:38 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-spotify-influences-what-songs-become-popular-ornot-2018-06-18?ns=prod/accounts-mw.
40. Id.; Mansoor Iqbal, Spotify Usage and Revenue Statistics (2020), B USINESS O FA PPS (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://www.businessofapps.com/data/spotify-statistics/.
41. Iqbal, supra note 40.
42. See Passy, supra note 39.
43. Nosheen Iqbal, Forget the DJs: Spotify Playlists Are the New Musical Starmakers, THE GUARDIAN (Apr.
28, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2019/apr/28/streaming-music-algorithms-spotify.
44. Andy Gensler & Ed Christman, How Spotify’s ‘Fake Artist’ Controversy Has Increased Tensions with
Label
Partners,
Could
Hurt
Its
Bottom
Line,
B ILLBOARD
(Jul.
19,
2017),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7872889/spotify-fake-artist-playlist-controversy-record-labeltensions-ipo; Owens, supra note 33.
45. Marc Hogan, Up Next: How Playlists Are Curating the Future of Music, P ITCHFORK (Jul. 16, 2018),
https://pitchfork.com/features/article/9686-up-next-how-playlists-are-curating-the-future-of-music/;
Ben
Popper, How Spotify’s Discover Weekly Cracked Human Curation at Internet Scale, THE V ERGE (Jul. 16, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2015/9/30/9416579/spotify-discover-weekly-online-music-curation-interview;
Pierce, supra note 32; Cherie Hu, Why Spotify Thinks Its ‘Self Driving Music’ Strategy Will Benefit Creators,
B ILLBOARD (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8249695/why-spotify-thinks-selfdriving-music-strategy-will-benefit-creators; Owens, supra note 33.
46. Hogan, supra note 45.
47. Id.; See generally The Art (and Science) of Music Playlists, H EWLETT P ACKARD (Nov. 11, 2018)
[hereinafter Hewlett Packard], https://store.hp.com/us/en/tech-takes/the-art-of-music-playlists.
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playlist after that initial hand selection.48 Here, the artificial intervention only occurs
when the playlist is distributed to the consumer, but not in the actual creation of that
playlist.49
In both of these situations, instances of music streaming fraud can significantly
impact the chances of commercial success for legitimate artists. 50 In cases of playola,
industry insiders may tip the playlist scales in favor of represented artists while
sacrificing the chances of independent artists or even upcoming or new artists.51 In
cases of music streaming fraud, a song that received fraudulent streams may be
placed on a music streaming playlist, appropriating commercial and financial success
that belonged to a legitimate artist.52
Additionally, playlist promotion has become a very important part of the
current music industry framework. 53 Music streaming now accounts for about eighty
percent of the total revenue generated by recorded music.54 Labels have included
playlist promotion in their marketing plans and budgets.55 A song placed on the right
playlist can lead to greater opportunities for that song, such as placements in film,
television and commercials.56 A song’s streams spike after that song is added to a
popular playlist.57 Once a song is added to that popular playlist, listeners will then
add that song to their own playlists.58 Increased streams increase chart position.59
Radio stations now use streaming data to make radio programming choices.60
Needless to say, the playlist has gained all of the power of making or breaking an
artist’s single.61

48.

Hogan, supra note 45; see generally Hewlett Packard, supra note 47.
Hogan, supra note 45; see generally Hewlett Packard, supra note 47.
50. Owens, supra note 33.
51. See generally Peoples, supra note 7; Owens, supra note 33.
52. See Ingham, supra note 9; Gensler & Christman, supra note 44; Owens, supra note 33.
53. Peoples, supra note 7; See Ingham, supra note 9; See generally Peoples, supra note 16.
54. Rob Arcand, Streaming Now Accounts for 80 Percent of the Music Industry’s Overall Revenue, S PIN
(Sept. 6, 2019, 12:49 PM), https://www.spin.com/2019/09/music-streaming-80-percent-of-music-industryoverall-revenue/.
55. Peoples, supra note 7; see generally Peoples, supra note 16.
56. Peoples, supra note 7.
57. Id.; Peoples, supra note 16.
58. Peoples, supra note 16.
59. Leight, supra note 1; Noah Yoo, How Artist Imposters and Fake Songs Sneak onto Streaming Services:
When Songs Leak on Spotify and Apple Music, Illegal Uploads Can Generate Substantial Royalty Payments –
But for Whom?, P ITCHFORK (Aug. 21, 2019), https://pitchfork.com/features/article/how-artist-imposters-andfake-songs-sneak-onto-streaming-services/; Cookson, supra note 33; Owens, supra note 33; See Adam K.
Raymond, The Streaming Problem: How Spammers, Superstars and Tech Giants Gamed the Music Industry,
V ULTURE (Jul. 5, 2017), https://www.vulture.com/2017/07/streaming-music-cheat-codes.html.
60. Peoples, supra note 7.
61. Id.; Owens, supra note 33.
49.
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II. THE ROYALTY POOL

Before analyzing the implications of fraud on the royalty pool, the royalty pool
must be explained more generally. There are two different royalty rates that pertain
to the royalty pool and require calculation: rates that apply to labels and artists, and
rates that apply to music publishers and songwriters.62
The pro-rated percentage allocated to the labels and artists are freely negotiated
between the streaming service and labels at a percentage of subscriber fees.63
Unfortunately, because these agreements are confidential the details of any current
agreements are not publicly available.64
The pro-rated percentage for music publishers and songwriters is determined by
statute.65 The standard royalty rate to be paid by digital music services to music
publishers and songwriters is 10.5% of revenue, less the amount of license fees paid
for the public performance per subscriber (“Payable Royalty Pool”).66 Fees paid for
public performances are those fees paid to the public performance societies like the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast
Music, Inc. (BMI), and the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers
(SESAC). 67 However, the 10.5% rate may not apply to all digital music services.68
The All-In Royalty Pool69 has multiple components for payments made to
music publishers and songwriters and is established as statute by the Copyright

62. See generally U.S. Music Streaming Royalties Explained, M ANATT , P HELPS & P HILLIPS, LLP n.3,
[hereinafter
Manatt]
https://www.manatt.com/Manatt/media/Media/PDF/US-Streaming-RoyaltiesExplained.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2020).
63. B OB K OHN, K OHN ON M USIC LICENSING 847 (5th ed. 2019).
64. Although current agreements are confidential, in 2015, the details of an agreement between Sony and
Spotify. The agreement is no longer valid, but provided Sony a $42.5 million in advance payments, $9 million
in advertising credits, a complex formula for royalty payments each year, and a most favored nation’s clause that
requires that Spotify pay Sony any higher rate that another label may negotiate. With these contract details, it is
impossible to know how much of these monies were received by the artist and this agreement applied only to
labels and represented artists. The contract did not include music publishers and songwriters. The contract was
once displayed online but has since been taken down out of respect for Sony. Further, without additional contract
details, it is impossible to know what other clauses may have affected monetary distributions. See Micah
Singleton, This Was Sony’s Music Contract with Spotify, THE VERGE (May 19, 2015, 10:05 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2015/5/19/8621581/sony-music-spotify-contract; see generally Ben Sisario, Sony
Terms
Uncovered
in
Contract,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
24,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/25/business/media/sony-terms-with-spotify-uncovered-in-contract.html.
65. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 385 (2019); 84 FR § 1918 (2019).
66. Kohn, supra note 63, at 845.
67. Id. at 1217.
68. Manatt, supra note 62; see also Kohn, supra note 63, at 846-850.
69. 37 C.F.R. § 385 (2019); 84 FR § 1918 (2019). In the “first step of the calculation, the parties determine
the All-In royalty pool; that is, the royalty that would be payable based on a formula balancing the greater of a
percent-of-service revenue and a percentage of one of two other expense measures. One expense measure if a
percent-of-royalties services pay to record companies for sound recording performance rights, differing
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Royalty Board.70 Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLC describes these allocations as
follows:
“There is a ‘Minimum All-In Royalty Pool’ calculated as a percentage of
the amount the service reports to pay labels (the “label payment”), which
applies if the result is greater than 10.5% of service revenue. That
percentage changes depending on whether the record label or the service
obtains the mechanical license. In practice, it is always the service, which
means the All-In Royalty Pool is calculated as 21% of the label payment.
If the licensee were ever the label, the All-In Royalty Pool will be 17.36%
of the label payment. There is also a ‘Subscriber-Based Floor’ of 80¢ per
subscriber per month, which will be used only if it results in a smaller
amount than the Minimum All-In Royalty Pool. There is an additional
mechanical Subscriber[-]Based Floor of 50¢ per subscriber per month
that applies if the Payable Royalty Pool is smaller after deducting
performance monies (which it almost certainly is for Spotify). Note that
for ad-supported interactive services, there are no Subscriber-Based
Floors and there are different percentages for the Minimum All-In
Royalty Pool. Practically, this means the All-In Royalty Pool for Spotify’s
ad-supported service is the greater of (i) 10.5% of service revenue and
(ii) 22% of the label payment.”71

However, for purposes of this paper, and to give a simpler presentation of the
complexities of the statute, the easiest calculation method to conceptualize the
general equation for the royalty pool for any given royalty period is:72
depending upon whether the sound recording licenses are pass-through or not pass-through. For certain
subscription services, the percent-of service revenue is balanced against the lesser of two or three other potential
mathematical outcomes. The second calculation reduces the All-In royalty pool to the “payable” royalty pool in
a two-step process. First the parties subtract royalties the services pay for musical works performance rights from
the All-In royalty established in the first calculation. This remainder is considered the payable royalty pool for
certain service offerings; viz., non-subscription, ad-supported, purchased content lockers, mixed service bundles,
and music bundles. For subscription service offerings, whether standalone or bundled, and depending upon
whether the offering is portable or non-portable, streaming only or mixed use, determining the payable royalty
pool requires a balancing of the mechanical remainder against a set rate for “qualified” subscribers per month to
determine the greater-of result. The set rate for qualified subscribers differs for each variation of subscription
offering. The final step in the rate determination for each service offering is an allocation among licensors based
upon the number of plays from each licensor’s catalog.”
70. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 385 (2019); 84 FR § 1918 (2019).
71. Manatt, supra note 62; see generally Kohn, supra note 63, at 846-850.
72. This is a conceptualized formula and does not include all the nuances of the equation, or provide the
different calculations as required by 37 C.F.R § 385 based on service offering. This is for conceptualization
purposes only. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 385 (2019); 84 FR § 1918 (2019).
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(Net Revenue) x (Total number of streams of a track) 73
__________________________________________________
(Total number of streams)
The net revenue is determined by the revenue obtained by monthly subscriber fees
minus overhead costs. This calculation is calculated monthly.74
This net revenue is then divided into three categories: the digital platform, the
rightsholders of the sound recordings, and the rightsholders of the composition. 75 In
using Spotify as an example, Spotify retains 30% of the revenue, the rightsholders of
the sound recordings receive 55-60% and the rightsholders of the compositions
receive 10-15% of this revenue.76 When the royalty allocation is broken down to a
per stream variable, the estimated calculated rate is approximately $0.004 per
stream.77
This royalty structure favors higher market share rightsholders.78 When a
particular rightsholder controls a greater market share within a given royalty pool,
that rightsholder will receive a greater share of that royalty allocation decreasing the
allocations for smaller market share rightsholders.79
III. THIRD PARTY FRAUD

There are many different types of third-party music streaming fraud in the current
music streaming market. Third parties may include third party promotional
companies, called playlist pluggers, which are hired by an artist or label.80 A third
party may also include a user that commits fraud by manipulating the royalty pool to

73. Chris Castle, Arithmetic on the Internet: The Ethical Pool Solution to Streaming Royalty Allocation,
M USIC TECH S OLUTIONS (Oct. 2, 2018), https://musictech.solutions/2018/10/02/arithmetic-on-the-internet-theethical-pool-solution-to-streaming-royalty-allocation/.
74. Id.
75. Chris Cooke, Dissecting the Digital Dollar, Part Two: Full Report 30, M USIC M ANAGERS F ORUM
(2016), https://themmf.net/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/MMF_DDD-Part-Two_Full-Report_Web.pdf.pdf.
76. Id.
77. This is an approximate value and not a fixed rate. The rate varies monthly based on individual service
calculations and services do not pay the same rates. See generally 2019-2020 Streaming Price Bible: YouTube
Is STILL the #1 Problem to Solve, THE TRICHORDIST (Mar. 5, 2020), https://thetrichordist.com/category/royaltyrates-2/. See also Hu, supra note 7.
78. Castle, supra note 73.
79. Id.
80. Kodi Vonn, How to Get on a Spotify Playlist (and How Not To): Playlist Promotion Companies Are on
the Rise. But Are They Worth It?, M EDIUM (Dec. 18, 2017), https://medium.com/bandbasher/playlist-pluggingcompanies-scam-savior-or-superfluous-a43ad36a763.
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obtain financial gain.81 In other instances, a third party may be a fan of an artist that
believes that they are helping their artist gain greater revenue and success by
manipulating the streaming system.82
A. Third-Party Playlist Pluggers
Third party playlist pluggers are companies that an artist, artist manager, and/or
label may hire for playlist promotion. This promotion is important as these
promotional efforts may allow for an artist’s compositions to gain access to
successful playlists created by companies like Spotify and Apple Music.83 In some
cases, these third-party services are legitimate and create sophisticated promotional
and marketing campaigns in order to promote a song to a particular fan base.84
Through that outreach, a song will reach success with listeners, and through that
success gain a highly-competitive placement on a digital music platform playlist. 85
However, there are other third-party playlist pluggers that have promised artists the
same type of services as offered by legitimate services, but actually use fraudulent
practices to falsely develop success for a particular artist or song. 86
These fraudulent third party playlist pluggers create fake streams – that is,
automated streams that do not actually represent a real listener - on digital music
service platforms like Spotify. 87 These fake streams not only increase the artist’s prorated royalty share, but also obtain enough success to land on a playlist.88 Companies,
like Streamify,89 offer this service on their website and even offer a warning that an
artist should not buy too many streams for a particular song as significant stream
increases for a particular composition may be labeled fraudulent by the digital music
streaming platforms.90 Streamify suggests buying increments of streams.91 However,
even though these practices may seem obviously fraudulent, many artists believe that
they are simply purchasing a marketing campaign for their composition.92 The artist

81.

Ingham, supra note 13.
See generally Respers France, supra note 11; Wang, supra note 2.
83. See generally Peoples, supra note 16; Vonn, supra note 80.
84. Peoples, supra note 16.
85. Id.
86. Vonn, supra note 80.
87. Fraudsters will buy streams for a client or give an artist the opportunity to purchase streams. Vonn, supra
note 80; Ingham, supra note 9.
88. Vonn, supra note 80; Hu, supra note 7.
89. Streamify is a third-party playlist plugger that allows customers to purchase streams on Spotify. See
Ingham, supra note 9.
90. Ingham, supra note 9.
91. Id.
92. See generally Hu, supra note 7.
82.
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does not always realize that companies like Streamify are actually using stream farms
or bot programs to falsely generate those streams.93
This false manipulation of streams violates most digital music platforms’ terms
and conditions of service.94 When a digital music platform, like Spotify, identifies
such fraud, the artist may be permanently removed from the service, at the service’s
discretion.95 And, as previously mentioned in this section, the artist may not be aware
of the fraudulent practices committed by the third party plugger. 96 For instance, when
the musician Ari Herstand used the Streamify placement service, he was later
removed from Spotify for fraudulent streams accumulated under his Streamify
contract.97 Unfortunately for artists like Herstand, the artists’ lack of knowledge of a
contracted third party placement plugger’s fraudulent practices does not prevent the
artist from being removed from a digital music platform.98 The artist, as the
contracting party with the digital music service, is the person that is responsible for
the contractual obligations contained in a digital music service’s terms and
conditions.99 There are multiple third party placement services that have been
accused of these practices. Although the Focus case is the first complaint filed, there
have been accusations against companies in addition to Streamify, like Spotlister,
StreamKO, Fiverr, and many others.100
B. Fake Artists, Songs, and Playlists
A popular practice for stream manipulation is for an end user to create fake artists,
fake songs, fake playlists, and fake user accounts to manipulate royalty pools to
falsely generate royalty income.101 In 2017, a Bulgarian scammer allegedly created
a fake artist account on Spotify and uploaded 467 digitally auto-generated tracks.102

93.

See generally Vonn, supra note 80.
A PPLE , I NC ., A PPLE M EDIA TERMS AND C ONDITIONS (2019), https://www.apple.com/legal/internetservices/itunes/us/terms.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2019) (explaining that you may not use the Services to plan
or engage in any illegal, fraudulent, or manipulative activity); Peoples, supra note 7 (explaining that Spotify’s
head of communications announced “new terms of service… which prohibit selling accounts and playlists or
“accepting any compensation, financial or otherwise, to influence…the content included on an account or
playlist); Raymond, supra note 59; Yoo, supra note 59.
95. Vonn, supra note 80.
96. Hu, supra note 7.
97. Vonn, supra note 80.
98. Id.; Hu, supra note 7.
99. Vonn, supra note 80; Hu, supra note 7.
100. Vonn, supra note 80; Hu, supra note 7.; Ingham, supra note 9.
101. See generally Tim Ingham, The Great Big Spotify Scan: Did a Bulgarian Playlister Swindle Their Way
to a Fortune on Streaming Service?, M USIC B US. WORLDWIDE (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/great-big-spotify-scam-bulgarian-playlister-swindle-way-fortunestreaming-service/.
102. Id.
94.
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Each of the tracks were a little over 30 seconds in length and all 467 tracks were
placed across two fake playlists entitled “Soulful Music” and “Music From the
Heart.”103 After creating these artists and playlists, the scammer allegedly then
opened 1200 individual fake accounts on the Spotify Premium platform. 104 Each
account was set to listen to the fake playlists on continual 30 second loops.105 This
false manipulation led the scammer to earn royalty income of over $400,000 per
month.106 These fraudulent playlists became so successful based on these forced
loops that the “Soulful Music” playlist ranked No. 11 and “Music from the Heart”
playlist ranked No. 22 on Spotify’s top revenue playlists in the United States.107 The
scam was discovered by a label executive who received internal Spotify chart lists
and notified Spotify. 108 Spotify removed the playlists, but only after the scammer
generated over a speculated $1 million dollars in royalty pool revenue.109
This “click-fraud”110 type of music streaming fraud has become rather
commonplace within digital music streaming platforms. Along with the scammer
above, there are also bots that masquerade as fake artists and create fake tracks, often
mimicking songs from established artists.111 The bots then repeatedly play the
streams and generate revenue each time the song loops.112 The bots will use multiple
accounts to avoid detection.113 Spotify has developed and uses an algorithm to detect
various factors considered to be artificial listening habits.114 Such artificial listening

103.

Id.
Id.
105. Ingham, supra note 101.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Click Fraud, I NVESTOPEDIA , https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/click-fraud.asp (last visited Nov.
24, 2020). Click fraud is similar to music streaming fraud as multiple clicks effects the overall outcome of the
product. In advertising, click fraud is used to decrease the value of an ad. In music streaming fraud, click fraud
is used to generate royalty income which, in turn, decreases the royalty revenue for legitimate streams. See
Bishop Cheen, Streaming Music Is Also a Victim of Click Fraud, S&P GLOBAL: M ARKET I NTELLIGENCE (Mar.
18,
2016,
1:09
PM),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/newsinsights/trending/8ltyrme8rsavsydv74sehw2.
111. Clinch, supra note 11.
112. Id.; see generally William Bedell, I Built a Botnet That Could Destroy Spotify with Fake Listens:
Automated Streaming Is the Next Frontier of Click Fraud, V ICE (Oct. 16, 2015, 9:00 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gv5xbx/i-built-a-botnet-that-could-destroy-spotify-with-fake-listens
(explaining how, in 2013, Peter Fillmore was among the first to demonstrate the automated programs could
generate massive royalties by having software-based robots to listen to music non-stop. Fillmore’s account
existed for 6 months, but Spotify took the account down. Also, the author mentions how he built a bot to exploit
the music service and accumulate royalties from fake streams).
113. Clinch, supra note 11; Bedell, supra note 112.
114. Clinch, supra note 11; Bedell, supra note 112.
104.
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habits can include excessive streaming by a small numbers of users may trigger
Spotify’s anti-fraud algorithm.115 Any account detected as an artificial listening habit
is then removed by Spotify.116 Some fraudsters have infiltrated artists’ page with
auto-generated songs to gain greater illegal gains by hoping the consumer will be
tricked into listening to the fake track.117 The consumer may listen to the fake track
believing it to be a new track released by the artist. 118 Other scams have included
fraudsters releasing previous unreleased songs, and sometimes released tracks under
similar titles, by famous musicians under a fake artist name.119
C. Bots
Although bots were mentioned in the previous section, there are different ways in
which a bot can be used to manipulate music streams.120 A bot is “a software program
that operates on the Internet and performs repetitive tasks.”121 A bot is automated and
runs according to programmed human instruction. 122 These bots operate amongst
many industries, but in the music industry a person programs the software to
repetitively stream a track, or tracks, of either legitimate songs by actual artists or
fake auto-generated tracks.123 In some cases, bots are merely individuals that register
accounts and play tracks for about 35 seconds repeatedly.124 Sophisticated bots are
computer programs that are designed to click on certain links at certain times.125 Bots
can be incorporated into click-farm environments to falsely boost streams.126 Peter
Fillmore, a security consultant in Melbourne Australia, used a sophisticated bot on a
115.

Clinch, supra note 11; Bedell, supra note 112.
Clinch, supra note 11; Bedell, supra note 112.
117. See generally Rob Arcand, El-P Calls Out Spotify for Not Protecting Artists Against Fraud, SPIN (Oct.
20, 2018), https://www.spin.com/2018/10/el-p-calls-out-spotify-for-not-protecting-artists-against-fraud/; Yoo,
supra note 59.
118. Raymond, supra note 59; see generally Arcand, supra note 117; Yoo, supra note 59.
119. Raymond, supra note 59; see generally Arcand, supra note 117; Yoo, supra note 59.
120. Vonn, supra note 80.
121. What Is a Bot?, C LOUDF ARE , https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/bots/what-is-a-bot/ (last visited
Dec. 15, 2020); See generally Paris Martineau, What Is a Bot?, WIRED (Nov. 16, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/the-know-it-alls-what-is-a-bot/.
122. What
Is
a
Bot?
Definitions
and
Examples,
MARKET
B US.
N EWS,
https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/botdefinition/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CA%20bot%20is%20a%20software,replace%20a%20human%20user’s%20be
havior.%E2%80%9D (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
123. Tim Ingham, The Music Industry Is Tackling Streaming Fraud with a Pointless ‘Code.’ It Won’t Work
...
but
These
Ideas
Might,
M USIC
B US.
WORLDWIDE
(Jun.
23,
2019),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/the-music-industry-is-tackling-streaming-fraud-with-a-pointlesscode-it-wont-work-but-these-ideas-might/.
124. Vonn, supra note 80.
125. Id.
126. Id.; Clinch, supra note 11.
116.
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now defunct platform, Rdio, to automate fake streams, and avoided detection for 6
months.127 William Bedell128 created his own sophisticated bot program to automate
fake streams on Spotify in 2015. 129 Bedell predicts, based on his experiment of fraud
on Spotify, that if a sophisticated computer-programed bot could mimic consumer
listening behavior well enough, the bot could be completely undetectable by the
digital music services current anti-fraud algorithms.130 Considering the ongoing use
of bots to generate streams and the length of times it takes for digital music platforms
to detect this type of fraud, Spotify, and any other affected digital music platform,
have not implemented enough policing measures to combat illegitimate parties from
accumulating fraudulent royalty payouts. 131
IV. INSIDER FRAUD: A NEW FORM OF PAYOLA

Music streaming fraud perpetrated by industry insiders has been labeled
playola.132 The term is a play-on the previously coined term payola.133 Payola occurs
when a person pays a DJ or radio programmer for a song placement on a radio
broadcast playlist.134 Playola similarly occurs when a person pays or influences a
playlist curator for a song’s placement on a particular playlist.135 Before proceeding
with insider manipulation of a music streaming playlist, it is important to address
payola and how the manipulation of radio playlists are strikingly similar to the
current speculated manipulation of the playlists on digital music platforms.

127.

See generally Bedell, supra note 112.
William Bedell is a computer engineer and journalist that wrote a step-by-step tutorial on how to set-up
a click fraud scheme using bots. See Wang, supra note 2.
129. See generally Bedell, supra note 112.
130. Id.
131. Id.; Hu, supra note 7; Wang, supra note 2.
132. See generally Peoples, supra note 7.
133. R.H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 269 (1979) (explaining
“[t]he term “payola” is generally said to have been introduced by the trade periodical Variety and its popularity
resulted from its use in that periodical”).
134. Id. at 269 (“In Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, payola is defined as “an undercover or
indirect payment for a commercial favor (as to a disc jockey for plugging a song.”). Payola, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/payola. (showing that Merriam-Webster continues to apply the
same payola definition) (last visited Dec. 31, 2019).
135. Peoples, supra note 7.
128.
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A. Payola
1. The History of Payola
Payola has been documented in the music industry as early as the 1800s.136
Payola began when songwriters started to pay leading performance artists and
orchestra band leaders to perform their material to gain further performances.137
Unfortunately, these payments eventually led to harassment and extortion of the paid
performing artists. 138 This pay-to-play mentality continued into the vaudeville
industry,139 and then into radio broadcasting.140 By the time radio broadcasting
became popular, record companies had emerged and represented an artist’s releases.
Radio disc jockeys became superstars, as their selections of songs could make or
break an artist.141 When disc jockeys started to realize the power they had in an
artist’s career, many began to demand payment from record companies to play new
material.142 Payments included cash, expensive gifts, homes, airplane tickets, drugs,
prostitutes or whatever else the disc jockey demanded.143 Some disc jockeys required
a portion of record royalties or a portion of copyright ownership in a composition
and would open their own publishing companies and talent agencies to account for
those royalties.144 Some disc jockeys would demand a substantial number of records
in exchange for plays, and would then open their own record stores to sell the free
records they required as payment.145 Disc jockeys began to refuse to play any new
material without some form of payment to do so.146 Any record company or music
publisher that refused to make such a payment was blacklisted across the radio
industry.147

136.
(1994).
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See generally K ERRY S EAGRAVE , P AYOLA IN THE M USIC I NDUSTRY : A H ISTORY, 1880-1991, 1-7
See generally id.
See generally id.
Id.at 8-29.
Id. at 30-50.
Seagraves, supra note 136 at 74-75.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 80, 98.
Id. at 80-83.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 80-81.
Seagraves, supra note 136 at 80.
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In 1938, Variety148 began reporting on pay-for-play in the radio industry,
coining the term “payola” to describe the activity.149 Billboard150 followed and began
reporting pay-for-play.151 Additionally, at this time, a small record company that
could not afford the payola payments filed a complaint with the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”).152
2. Payola and Federal Government Interventions
Throughout the late 1950s multiple government investigations occurred,
including an investigation launched by the House Special Committee on Legislative
Oversight, to investigate payola.153 In 1957, a senator proposed an amendment to the
Communications Act that would force broadcasters to divest themselves of
conflicting interests created through payola schemes.154 The FCC threatened to
terminate radio broadcasting licenses from any radio stations that participated in
payola practices.155
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) also began an investigation based on
complaints of unfair methods in competition in interstate commerce. The FTC
investigation was initiated because payola had the ability to suppress competition
and to unfairly divert business from competitors in violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.156 Three record manufacturers and six independent record
distributors were accused.157 However, the FTC’s powers were limited to cease and
desist orders, but their continued findings of violations led to the Department of
Justice’s (“DOJ”) intervention.158
After public Congressional hearings in 1960, a new amendment to the
Communications Act was passed.159 The Amendment stated that payola was

148. Variety is a magazine and internet news source that specializes in the entertainment business. About Us,
VARIETY, https://variety.com/variety-about-us/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2020); see also Variety (magazine),
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Variety_(magazine) (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
149. Seagraves, supra note 136 at 1, 52-100.
150. Billboard is an entertainment trade magazine that specializes in music, video, and home entertainment.
Billboard
(magazine),
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billboard_(magazine)#:~:text=Billboard%20publishes%20a%20news%20website
,music%2C%20video%20and%20home%20entertainment.&text=The%20charts%20track%20music%20sales,s
ongs%20was%20introduced%20in%201958 (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
151. Seagraves, supra note 136 at 75, 80-81.
152. Id. at 75.
153. Id. at 100.
154. Id. at 94.
155. Id. at 101.
156. Seagraves, supra note 136 at 111, 116-124.
157. Id. at 116.
158. Id. at 156.
159. Id. at 94-123.
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acceptable only when “sponsorship” was announced to the listening audience.160
Prosecutions for any violations would be handled by the DOJ and the FCC would
handle any administrative penalties and license revocations.161
However, this new law did not stop the practice of payola.162 Payola went
underground, which in turn made it harder to prove. 163 Record companies and disc
jockeys began to use independent promoters,164 and thus payola fees were hidden in
advertising and promotion budgets. 165 Rumors began that the mafia had become
involved in the practice and would threaten violence on anyone that would not
participate.166 The FCC attempted to conduct additional hearings, but could not find
evidence to conduct a formal investigation.167 Informal industry complaints
continued, but no one from the music industry would come forward for fear of being
blacklisted.168
In 1986, NBC televised a two part series claiming that independent promoters
had strong connections with organized crime.169 NBC’s report claimed that organized
crime was now controlling payola.170 The Recording Industry Association of
America ( “RIAA”) released a statement that denied all allegations from the NBC
report.171 At this time, a New York federal grand jury investigating payola issued a
sweeping subpoena to the RIAA that demanded all RIAA documentation pertaining
to record company relations with industry promoters.172 The FCC refused to
investigate because past experience had failed to turn up any relevant evidence.173
Congress tried to initiate investigations, but no one within the industry was willing
to testify.174 Another NBC report was televised.175 The RIAA had begun an internal

160.

See generally 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1960); see generally 47 U.S.C. § 508 (1960).
See generally 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1960); see generally 47 U.S.C. § 508 (1960).
162. See generally Seagraves, supra note 136, at 159-214.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 95.
165. Id. at 195-221.
166. Id.
167. Seagraves, supra note 136, at 195-221.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 196-197.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 197.
172. Id.
173. Seagraves, supra note 136, at 200.
174. Id. at 203. The industry’s unwillingness to testify may have been due to a fear of being blacklisted from
radio. See note 169.
175. Id. at 205.
161.
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investigation, but the investigation was squashed.176 Although investigations and
probes began across the United States, all indictments were eventually dropped. 177
In the 2000s, the New York Attorney General’s office led another investigation
into major labels’ and radio stations’ payola practices.178 The investigation turned up
enough illegal payola evidence to force the major labels179 and several prominent
radio chains to pay million-dollar settlements and agree to change their practices
(“2005 Settlements”).180
Payola, although still in existence, remained untested until September of 2019
when the FCC issued a letter to the RIAA that demanded the RIAA investigate
current payola practices in the industry.181
B. Playola
As the Internet has leveled many power blocks of the old music business,
playlists have become valuable currency in streaming’s new world order,
so much so that record companies now actively promote – and sometimes
pay for – their songs to appear on such services as Spotify, Deezer, and
Apple Music.
-Glenn Peoples, Billboard182
Just as the selection by a radio DJ could make or break a song in the twentieth
century, the selection for a streaming playlist is the key to success today - as was the
case with payola, where there is power, there is “pay-for-play.”183 Major label
marketing executives have stated that “popular playlists can and have been
bought”184 and this is considered part of the playola practice.185 According to a 2015
176.

Id. at 206.
Id. at 195-221.
178. Elias Leight, Want to Get on the Radio? Have 50,000?: 15 Years Ago, New York’s Attorney General
Investigated Pay-For-Play in the Radio Industry. Insiders Say the Practice Lives on – in a More Sophisticated
Form, R OLLING S TONE (Aug. 6, 2019, 1:09 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/radiostations-hit-pay-for-play-867825/ (explaining that the New York Attorney General’s office found that “money
and other “valuable considerations” moved among labels or middlemen known as “indie promoters” and radio
stations.”).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See generally Elias Leight, FCC Commissioner Asks RIAA to Investigate Payola Allegations:
Commissioner Mike O’Reilly Sends Letter “to Determine Whether the Law Is Being Followed or Whether Any
Problematic Conduct Must Be Addressed, R OLLING S TONE (Sept. 5, 2019, 2:13 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/payola-radio-fcc-riaa-letter-880304/.
182. Peoples, supra note 7.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
177.
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Billboard article, the price of playlist “pay-for-play” can range from $2,000 to
$10,000 depending on the fan size of an individual playlist.186 Unlike payola, playola
is not illegal.187 Currently, playola is not illegal because the Communications
Amendment that covered payola is strictly limited to radio broadcasts and does not
apply to digital streaming.188 However, some companies, like Spotify, include in their
terms of service a prohibition of selling accounts or playlists or “accepting any
compensation, financial or otherwise, to influence . . . the content included on an
account or playlist.”189 However, playola may fall outside of these prohibitions
because most labels refer to these payments as consultancy fees. 190 Some companies
believe that because they pay small consultancy fees to independent promoters to
only ensure that the playlist curator hears the song, it cannot be proven that the
curator is influenced by the payment.191 Some playlist curators are paid $100-150 to
hear and consider a song.192 Many within the industry fear that placements on
playlists, as was the case with payola, are quickly becoming available only to labels
and artists with big pockets.193
In addition to the payment of fees to playlist curators, labels, artist managers
and artists have also been accused of hiring third-party playlist pluggers to
manipulate stream boosts.194 Although fraudulent third-party plugging is also
performed by industry outsiders as described in supra Section III, 195 when industry
insiders, like labels and artists, engage in the same tactics it is a form of industry
playola.196 Y-Kollektiv197 interviewed an unidentified streaming fraudster that
claimed his services were being used by some of the biggest artists in the market. 198
The fraudster claimed to generate over € 100,000 a month because of the fraudster’s
186.

Id.
Id.
188. 47 U.S.C. § 317.
189. Peoples, supra note 7.
190. Peoples, supra note 16.
191. Peoples, supra note 7.
192. Id.
193. Id.; Owens, supra note 33.
194. Ingham, supra note 13; Peoples, supra note 7; Anna Nicolaou, Music Industry Targets Troll Farms
Distorting Streaming Revenues, F INANCIAL TIMES (Jun. 20, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/371b7b9692e1-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271; See generally Ingham, supra note 9; See Vonn, supra note 80.
195. See supra Section III.
196. See generally Peoples, supra note 16; Peoples, supra note 7.
197. Y-Kollektiv is a German YouTube channel that transmits video documentaries and is operated by the
public
service.
Y-Kollektiv,
WIKIPEDIA ,
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=de&u=https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Y-Kollektiv&prev=search
(Last visited Dec. 31, 2019).
198. Ingham, supra note 13; Y-Kollektiv, Der Rap Hack: Kauf Dich in die Charts! Wie Klickzahlen
manipuliert
warden,
Y OUTUBE
(May
23,
2019)
[hereinafter
Y-Kollektiv],
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qiqYuSQwkHo.
187.
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ability to operate or gain access to 150,000-250,000 streaming accounts.199 Most of
his clients are said to be artist managers, but also include labels and artists as well.200
The actions of major artists, artist managers, and labels using third parties, stream
farms or other bot type activity, if true, not only boost artist streams, but also gives
major artists a greater market share.201 An artificially increased market share
provides these artists and labels more royalty income to the detriment of newer and/or
independent artists and labels.202
In addition, major labels have purchased major influential playlists to guarantee
placements.203 All of the major labels now own some of Spotify’s most popular and
largest playlists: Universal Music Group owns Digster, Sony Music Group owns
Filtr, and Warner Music Group owns Topsify.204
Artists have also been accused of requesting that fans help manipulate streams
in that artist’s favor.205 In 2015, the band Vulfpeck asked fans to stream their new
album to boost revenue to finance a new album.206 The fans obliged and the band
earned $20,000 in royalties.207 This request would not usually warrant any
accusations of fraud except, here, the album consisted of nothing but silence.208
Additionally, in 2015, the band Ohm & Sport created an application entitled
Eternify.209 The application let fans listen to the band’s music on recurring 30 second
loops, triggering substantial boosts in royalty payments.210 When questioned
regarding the application, Ohm & Sport contested that because success in streaming
is slanted towards major artists, the band used the application in order to compete in
the marketplace.211 Fans similarly used looping software to help Nelly pay a $2.4
million tax debt.212
Although playola and payola are very similar in practice and effect, payola laws
only cover pay-for-play in broadcasting.213 There are currently no direct laws to
protect affected artists, labels, rightsholders, or music consumers from manipulated

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
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206.
207.
208.
209.
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music streaming playlists via playola.214 However, the manipulation of data affects
royalty payouts to other artists, labels and rightsholders.215 Manipulated playlists do
not just affect these parties, but also affect the choice of the consumer.216 These
manipulations create not only unfair competition in the marketplace for artists and
rightsholders, but also manipulates how the music consumer discovers new music by
manipulating consumer choice. The law should be changed to include protections
against playola.
V. DIGITAL MUSIC SERVICE FRAUD

Digital music platforms have also been accused of committing music streaming
fraud.217 Various digital music services have been accused of diluting the royalty
pool for their own benefit by creating their own songs and placing those songs on
popular playlists.218 Another digital music platform has been accused of outright data
manipulation.219
Spotify has been accused of creating their own fake artists and hiring producers
to generate songs to dilute royalty payouts so Spotify may retain a higher net
income.220 Tim Ingham, in a Music Business Worldwide article, cites multiple
unnamed sources that have accused Spotify of paying producers a flat fee, in addition
to studio and musician expenses, to create tracks with certain musical
specifications.221 Spotify then holds the master recording rights, where the publishing
ownership rights are negotiated between the parties.222 These tracks, upon
completion, are then placed on popular playlists (jazz, chill, peaceful piano) and then
collect money from the royalty pool with other rightsholders.223 Although Spotify
has been accused of creating music in order to dilute the royalty pool and decrease
royalty payouts to other artists, Spotify, if true, is still actually creating music that,
receives streams from real listeners.224 These are not auto-generated compositions as
214.

Peoples, supra note 7.
Leight, supra note 1; Gensler & Christman, supra note 44.
216. Raymond, supra note 59.
217. Id.; see generally Ingham, supra note 17.
218. Ingham, supra note 17.
219. Markus Tobiassen & Kjetil Saeter, Strømme-Kuppet, D AGENS N ÆVINGSLIV (May 9, 2018),
https://www.dn.no/staticprojects/special/2018/05/09/0600/dokumentar/strommekuppet/
(explaining
the
newspaper claims access to TIDAL’s own hard drive containing proof to these falsifications of stream numbers).
220. Ingham, supra note 17; Raymond, supra note 59; Gensler & Christman, supra note 44; see generally
Roy Trakin & Jem Aswad, Spotify Denies Creating ‘Fake Artists,’ Although Multiple Sources Claim the Practice
Is Real, VARIETY (Jul. 11, 2017, 11:38 AM), https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/spotify-denies-creating-fakeartists-although-multiple-sources-claim-the-practice-is-real-1202492307/.
221. Ingham, supra note 17.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Gensler & Christman, supra note 44.
215.
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is the case with bots.225 However, these songs are specifically created for placement
on the most popular playlists of certain genres. 226 As previously mentioned,
placement on popular playlists significantly boosts streams and market share that
allows these compositions and recordings to acquire a much greater portion of
royalties from the royalty pool.227 Although the sources stated that this practice was
to intended by Spotify to perfectly curate a playlist to consumer preference, the
compositions nevertheless increase Spotify profits at the expense of other artists.228
In 2018, a Norwegian financial newspaper229 accused the music streaming service
Tidal of falsifying tens of millions of streams in favor of certain artists.230
Specifically, the digital service was accused of manipulating stream numbers in favor
of Beyoncé’s album Lemonade and Kanye West’s album Life of Pablo.231 In June
2020, the Norwegian Supreme Court revealed that Tidal had been an official suspect
in an investigation by Norwegian authorities for about a year for streaming
manipulation.232 Further, the Norwegian Supreme Court ruled that Norwegian
authorities could seize Tidal’s proprietary documents in order for authorities to
further conduct their investigation.233
All these fraudulent practices dilute royalty payouts to legitimate licensors.234
Because the current royalty pool is distributed based on market share and prorated
number of streams, there is an argument to protect those legitimate members of the
royalty pool.235
Additionally, in the recent Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making
and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords III) issued by the Copyright Royalty
Board in February of 2019, the Copyright Royalty Board determined that the digital
music services did not have to pay for fraudulent streams by a quantitative
measure.236 In the definitions section of 37 C.F.R. § 385, the definition of “Play”
excludes any same stream played by a single end user more than 50 straight times237
as that stream is considered fraudulent. The definition makes sense, but it doesn’t
answer or solve various fraud issues. This definition does not consider any fraudulent
225.

Id.
Id.; Trakin & Aswad, supra note 220; Raymond, supra note 59; see generally Ingham, supra note 17.
227. Gensler & Christman, supra note 44; see also Hu, supra note 7; Wang, supra note 2.
228. Ingham, supra note 17.
229. The newspaper claims access to TIDAL’s own hard drive containing proof to these falsifications of
stream numbers. Tobiassen & Saeter, supra note 219.
230. Id.; Stassen, supra note 18.
231. Tobiassen & Saeter, supra note 219; Stassen, supra note 18.
232. Stassen, supra note 18.
233. Id.
234. Leight, supra note 1; Hu, supra note 7; Gensler & Christman, supra note 44.
235. Wang, supra note 2; Hu, supra note 7; Gensler & Christman, supra note 44.
236. 37 C.F.R. § 385 (2019); 84 FR § 1918 (2019).
237. §385.2.
226.
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stream manipulation by the service itself.238 The definition also does not define any
rules for when a streaming service does not immediately recognize fraud but paid out
royalties before the fraudulent activity was detected by the service. 239
VI. PREVENTION? WHAT PREVENTION?

A. Why Has Little Been Done to Actively Prevent Fraud and Playola?
The digital music platforms and the music industry have done very little to prevent
music streaming fraud and playola.240 This lack of implementation has led to a lot of
music industry-wide speculation of fraud.241 Some speculation is pointed at the
digital music platforms because direct admission that the fraud is as prevalent as
speculated could hurt their public image and current business relationships.242
Most of the speculation, however, is pointed at the Spotify platform directly and
the deals that Spotify initially formed with the major labels.243 In initial negotiations
between the majors244 and Spotify, Spotify needed to license the major labels’
catalogs in order to offer enough popular music to provide a viable business model.245
As payment for these licenses, Spotify gave each major label an equity partnership
in the company.246 If Spotify admitted fraud, this could decrease the value of the
equity that each major label holds in the company.247 As a result, it is in the interest
of both Spotify and the major labels to protect Spotify’s reputation. Neither side has
incentive to expose the fraud.248 Additionally, the admission of fraud could hold the

238.

Id.
Id.
240. Ingham, supra note 13; Wang, supra note 2.
241. Gensler & Christman, supra note 44; see Leight, supra note 1; Ingham, supra note 13.
242. Gensler & Christman, supra note 44; see Leight, supra note 1; see Raymond, supra note 59; see Ingham,
supra note 13.
243. Gensler & Christman, supra note 44; Peoples, supra note 7; see generally Tim Ingham, Here’s Exactly
How Many Shares the Major Labels and Merlin Bought in Spotify – and What Those Stakes Are Worth Now,
M USIC B US. WORLDWIDE (May 14, 2018), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/heres-exactly-howmany-shares-the-major-labels-and-merlin-bought-in-spotify-and-what-we-think-those-stakes-are-worth-now/.
244. Record Label, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Record_label (last visited Dec. 18, 2020);
Majors are a term of art and refer to the major recording labels that include Universal Music Group, Warner
Music Group and Sony Music Entertainment. Matthew Justin, Indie vs. Major Record Labels: Which Is Right
for You?, I CON C OLLECTIVE (May 27, 2020), https://iconcollective.edu/indie-vs-major-recordlabels/#:~:text=The%20big%20three%20major%20record,either%20of%20the%20big%20three.
245. Gensler & Christman, supra note 44; see also Ingham, supra note 243 (explaining that Sony Music was
given 5.8% stake, Universal was given a 4.8% stake, and Warner Bros. Music was given a 3.8% stake. Those
stakes have since decreased since Spotify went public, but all three maintained some equity share).
246. Gensler & Christman, supra note 44.
247. Gensler & Christman, supra note 44; Peoples, supra note 7; see Ingham, supra note 243.
248. Gensler & Christman, supra note 44; Peoples, supra note 7; see Ingham, supra note 243.
239.
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company secondarily liable, further decreasing the value of Spotify and thus the
equity that the labels maintain.249
There is also some speculation that the music industry does not work towards
preventive fraud measures as it would expose various playola schemes that all parties
may have committed.250 In either case, the boosts in streams helps the label’s bottom
line and leaves those labels, artists, music publishers and songwriters that do not
participate in playola schemes exposed to decreased royalties.251 Additionally, some
of the labels may have participated in playola practices only to compete with other
labels that participate in the practice.
The unfortunate possibility is that proper fraud prevention methods have not been
put in place as it might expose the playola by music industry insiders and fraud
committed internally by the digital music services.252 In order for proper measures to
be implemented, fraud prevention may require Congressional involvement by
legislative action.
B. Current Prevention Methods
Some forms of policing playola have been introduced in the industry, but the
effectiveness of those measures has been limited. Preventive measures have included
a development of an industry code of conduct253 and third-party technological
developments to monitor and detect fraudulent streaming patterns.254
In June of 2019, record companies, music publishers, industry organizations
and streaming services partnered and signed a 21-point “code of conduct” created to
prevent and eliminate fake music streams.255 This code of conduct defines streaming
manipulation as “the artificial creation of plays, by human or non-human means, of
online and offline plays on audio and audio-visual streaming services, i.e., where
those plays do not represent genuine listening.”256 Under this code, artificial creation

249. Paige Clark, The Invisible Defense Against Music Piracy, 15 J. M ARSHALL R EV. I NTELL. P ROP. L.
297, 299 (2016).
250. Ingham, supra note 13.
251. Leight, supra note 1; Hu, supra note 7; Gensler & Christman, supra note 44.
252. Ingham, supra note 13.
253. Id.
254. See generally Chris Eggerton, Distrokid Teams with Audible Magic to Combat Streaming Piracy,
B ILLBOARD (Jun. 12, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8514899/distrokid-audible-magiccombat-streaming-piracy, Hu, supra note 7.
255. Ingham, supra note 13.
256. Jessica Nicholson, Major Music Industry Companies Sign “Code of Best Practice” Against Streaming
Manipulation, MUSIC R OW (Jun. 20, 2019), https://musicrow.com/2019/06/major-music-industry-companiessign-code-of-best-practice-against-streaming-manipulation/; Amy X. Wang, The Music Industry Signs a Pledge
Against
Fake
Streams,
ROLLING
STONE
(Jun.
20,
2019,
3:07
PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/news/music-industry-icmp-pledge-against-fake-streams-
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includes, but is not limited to, the manipulation of streams through automated
processes (“bots,” “click-farms” or “stream farms”).257 The code is not legally
binding on the industry or any of the signatories, and does not affect any terms and
conditions of any private agreements of the parties.258 This code of conduct has been
highly criticized throughout the music industry because it lacks enforcement
mechanisms and many critics feel the code will do nothing to prevent future
streaming manipulation.259 According to these critics, the code consists only of
“imprecise promises by the streaming services to monitor and crack down on illegal
streaming activity . . . [and] imprecise pledges by labels to share information” when
possible fraud is detected.260
Another development in playola prevention is the emergence of third-party
companies that have developed software that may be able to detect fraudulent
activity.261 This software recognizes patterns of streaming manipulation that may
occur through fake user accounts, fake artists, and streaming farms. 262 The software
is supposed to detect sudden shifts in listener patterns and determine whether the
activity is legitimate.263
Unfortunately, there have been no developments to prevent old payola
schemes, like pay-for-play for radio airplay, from infiltrating music streaming
platforms and manipulating curated playlists, in turn diluting the royalty pool.
VII. I’M NOT LIABLE – YOU’RE LIABLE

A. Why Litigation Is Not the Answer
Before the Communications Act of 1934 was amended, while payola was not
expressly illegal, it may nevertheless have constituted actionable fraud or unfair
competition. The practice of playola is in a similar situation today. There are many
forms of music streaming fraud, but as of today’s date, little has been done to prevent
it. Rightsholders have been able to identify inconsistencies in playlist reports, and
multiple journalists have demonstrated the ability to fraudulently game the system;

850428/#:~:text=On%20Thursday%2C%20an%20assortment%20of,collective%20agreement%20on%20the%2
0issue.
257. Nicholson, supra note 256.
258. Wang, supra note 256.
259. Ingham, supra note 13.
260. Id.
261. Hu, supra note 7. See infra note 399-400 and accompanying text.
262. Eggerton, supra note 254; see generally Rebeat, F RAUD D ETECTION S OFTWARE , [hereinafter R EBEAT ]
https://rebeat.com/fraud-detection-software/ (Last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
263. Eggerton, supra note 254; see generally R EBEAT , supra note 262.

Journal of Business & Technology Law

411

Smith-Burton (DO NOT DELETE)

8/10/2021 10:03 PM

‘Playola’ and Fraud on Digital Music Platforms
therefore, one would think that litigation is imminent. 264 But why haven’t more
lawsuits been filed by the rightsholders against these third-party streaming promotion
companies? Why haven’t rightsholders filed complaints against the digital music
platforms themselves? The reason is because successful litigation is almost
impossible in these cases.265
The most comparable legal analysis to determine why music streaming fraud is
not litigated is best answered in the litigation of “click fraud” in advertising.266 Click
fraud is defined as a type of fraud that is committed by repeatedly clicking an
advertisement to fraudulently increase the cost to an advertiser.267 Many companies
have tried to file complaints that contain claims of click fraud against Google,
Facebook and many others, but most of these cases were dismissed by the court, or
at the very least, the click fraud claim was dismissed.268
Most of these dismissals are due to an insufficient showing of fraud. 269 Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b), any claim of fraud is subject to
heightened pleading requirements.270 This heightened pleading requirement means
that a plaintiff that alleges fraud is required to state with particularity the
circumstances constituting the instance or instances of fraud.271 The plaintiff must
identify the “who, what, where, when and how” of the alleged misconduct and why
that misconduct is fraudulent.272 If a plaintiff does not have an inside source that can
obtain particular documentation that demonstrates an instance of fraud, the plaintiff
may only have circumstantial evidence of the possibility of fraud. Circumstantial
evidence does not meet the exact “who, what, where, when and how” the heightened
pleading requires.273

264. See generally Bedell, supra note 112; see generally Ingham, supra note 9; Ingham, supra note 101;
Wang, supra note 2.
265. See Wang, supra note 2.
266. Cheen, supra note 110.
267. Click Fraud, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/click%20fraud (last
visited Jan. 1, 2020).
268. See generally Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007); see generally Singh v.
Google LLC, No. 16-cv-03734-BLF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27111 (N.D. Ca. 2018); see generally Woods v.
Google Inc., No: 11-cv-1263-JF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88795 (N.D. Ca. 2011); see generally In re Facebook
PPC Adver. Litig., No. 09-cv-03043-JF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136505 (N. D. Ca. 2010).
269. See generally Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007); see generally Singh v.
Google LLC, No. 16-cv-03734-BLF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27111 (N.D. Ca. 2018); see generally Woods v.
Google Inc., No: 11-cv-1263-JF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88795 (N.D. Ca. 2011); see generally In re Facebook
PPC Adver. Litig., No. 09-cv-03043-JF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136505 (N. D. Ca. 2010).
270. Singh, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27111 at *8; Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
271. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA,
317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003)).
272. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b)).
273. Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1055 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
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Further, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal
sufficiency of a claim.”274 In Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., the Court determined
that based on 12(b)(6), a Court’s dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable
legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a particular cognizable
legal theory.275 Again, this sufficiency of alleged facts is an issue in click fraud
accusations against advertising platforms.276 Although there may be indications of
fraud or the possibility that fraud exists based upon a trail of miscellaneous
documents, merely conclusory statements stringing these facts together will not meet
the heightened pleading requirement of fraud and will fall short of establishing
sufficient facts to meet the burden of proof. 277 In fact, the Ashcroft v. Iqbal Court
stated, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.”278
Although the Court examining the facts of a click fraud case may accept the facts of
the case as true, the facts themselves may not draw enough conclusory evidence to
proceed at trial.279 In fact, these cases usually result in just that: a string of facts that
may be true, but not enough to provide sufficient evidence of fraud.280
As with click fraud, complaints of music streaming fraud would also typically
lack sufficient facts to meet the heightened pleading requirements of fraud.
Rightsholders may be able to show irregularities in chart reporting and show that
users have notified them of irregular listening activity on their accounts, but those
few pieces are likely to fall short of the court’s requirements of a heightened
pleading.281 When labels have reported these accusations to the digital music
platforms, these platforms have remained silent on whether these specific reports are
fraudulent, let alone whether additional fraud exists.282 The digital music services
hold all of the evidence on specific circumstances of any fraudulent activity and it is
unlikely those services would provide that information to a rightsholder for fear the
platform could also be held liable for the fraudulent activity or practices.283

274.

Narrow v. Black, 250 F. 3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (referencing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
Narrow, 250 F.3d at 732 (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).
276. See generally Feldman, 513 F.Supp. 2d 229 (2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
277. See generally id.
278. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Bell, 550 U.S. at 555).
279. Narrow, 250 F.3d at 732 (citing Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996)).
280. Id.
281. See generally Bedell, supra note 112; see generally Ingham, supra note 9; see generally Ingham, supra
note 101.
282. Wang, supra note 2; Nicolaou, supra note 194; Yoo, supra note 59.
283. See generally Bedell, supra note 112; see generally Ingham, supra note 9; see generally Ingham, supra
note 101. However, there could be instances where a digital music platform may be willing to hand evidence
275.
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What about the unidentified fraudulent accounts that have manipulated the royalty
pool? For those fraudsters that have auto-generated compositions and created fake
artist accounts, rightsholders may have little success in litigation.284 First, the
rightsholder cannot go after the fraudster unless that person can be identified or
tracked.285 Second, without sufficient facts of the fraud itself, as evidence of which
is only in possession of a digital music platform, any litigation under a vicarious
liability claim against a digital music service would meet the same fate as click fraud
cases.286
Additionally, fraudsters are uploading unreleased albums or songs of artists
without rightsholders’ permission.287 The digital music platforms have been notified
of the copyright infringing activity of some users, but the infringing activity
continues to occur.288 In cases such as these, the digital music service may be held as
a contributory infringer. 289 In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Court stated
that in order for a plaintiff to establish contributory infringement, the plaintiff must
show that a defendant had a reasonable knowledge of a specific infringement, knows
or should know that infringing material is available on the platform, and fails to act
to prevent viral distribution. 290 However, these elements may also be impossible for
a potential plaintiff to prove with mere circumstantial evidence.
B. How the Digital Music Services MAY Be Held Contributory Liable Based on
Past Precedent
When a fraudster uploads the copyrighted material to a digital music platform in
order to manipulate the royalty pool, a digital platform may be held contributory
liable.291 Typically, an artist, label, publisher or songwriter will notify the digital
platform that the infringing material exists.292 Typically, in these cases, a digital
music platform like Spotify will remove the infringing material per their terms of
use.293 However, although Spotify may have removed the material as infringing, the

over to a rightsholder in a case of third-party playlist pluggers that has been removed from a platform due to
fraudulent practice for a precise instance of a particular third-party fraud case.
284. See generally Ingham, supra note 101; see generally Yoo, supra note 59.
285. See generally Leight, supra note 1; Wang, supra note 2.
286. Narrow v. Black, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d
696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).
287. Yoo, supra note 59.
288. Id.; see generally Arcand, supra note 117; Hu, supra note 7.
289. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
290. Id. at 1027.
291. See generally id.
292. Ingham, supra note 101; see generally Arcand, supra note 117; Yoo, supra note 59.
293. Hu, supra note 7; Yoo, supra note 59.
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material may reappear under a different user account. 294 Multiple infringing songs
from the same artist appear to replace each removed infringing composition. 295 Many
times, these infringing uses become viral and gain extensive royalty revenue before
the infringing compositions are taken down by the digital music platform 296 and a
royalty check has already been sent to the infringing party. 297 As a result, the royalty
pool is diluted. 298 This contributory infringement has expanded past the days of
Napster, when an infringing Napster download only supplanted a sale of the affected
artists’ song, and moved into a universe in which every rightsholder is affected by
one single act of copyright infringement because the dilution of the royalty pool
affects all participants in the streaming marketplace.299 The digital music platform is
ultimately in control of everything on the platform and is thus in the best place to
implement preventative measures to protect the copyrights of licensors.300
Further, in BMG Rights Management (US), LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc.
(“BMG I”), the District Court found Cox Communications liable for contributory
infringement for third-party users.301 In this instance, Cox subscribers shared
copyrighted files that the subscriber did not have permission to do.302 Cox maintained
that their user agreement reserved the right to suspend or terminate subscribers who
use Cox services to post, copy, transmit or disseminate any content that infringes the
copyrights of another party. 303 However, Cox rarely terminated accounts of repeat
infringers and when Cox did terminate infringers’ accounts, it always reactivated
those accounts.304 Additionally, Cox had only created a limited automated system to
handle notifications of infringement and, although maintaining a thirteen strike
policy against users that infringe on another’s property rights, the policy was rarely
implemented.305

294.

Yoo, supra note 59.
Id.
296. See generally Ingham, supra note 101; Yoo, supra note 59.
297. See generally Ingham, supra note 101; Yoo, supra note 59.
298. Wang, supra note 2, Hu, supra note 7; Gensler & Christman, supra note 44.
299. Wang, supra note 2, Gensler & Christman, supra note 44.
300. Wang, supra note 2; Yoo, supra note 59.
301. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns., Inc., 199 F.Supp. 3d 958, 973-980 (4th Cir. 2018);
BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 304-305 (4th Cir. 2018). The contributory
infringement award in this case was remanded for a new trial due to erroneous jury instructions. The jury
instruction should have allowed for the jury to determine contributory infringement by willful blindness but not
negligence.
302. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 304-305 (4th Cir. 2018).
303. Id. at 299.
304. Id. at 304-305.
305. Id.
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By the following year, Cox Communications was sued again by 53 members of
the RIAA for unauthorized downloads and distribution across its network. 306 Cox
had attempted to adopt a policy to respond to alleged acts of infringement. 307 Cox
received and processed notices of infringement and had implemented a program to
notify subscribers identified in those received notices.308 The plaintiffs, in the
complaint, identified Cox accounts that had received three or more infringement
notices and established those accounts as the basis for Cox’s liability.309 This Court
applied the holding of Luvdarts, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC that defined the proper
standard of knowledge as “specific enough knowledge of infringement that the
defendant could do something about it.”310 In Perfect 10 v. Amazon, Inc, and as
applied by this Court, the Court also held this same standard but also determined that
a service provider’s knowing failure to prevent infringing actions could be the basis
for imposing contributory infringement.311 A proper notification may include
information and specific data about an individual infringing account, specific
infringing activity of that individual user, a time stamp for the infringing data, and
the date the notice was sent.312 The Court determined because the plaintiff’s
notifications included the above-mentioned information, Cox was knowledgeable of
specific instances of infringement and, therefore, could be held contributory liable. 313
The Cox case is slightly different than some of the actions that the digital music
platforms take today. Users may be removed at a digital music platform’s discretion,
if the platform sees any patterns of infringing activity.314 Each platform, like Cox,
includes a policy in their terms and conditions of service that warns any user that
copyright infringement of any kind will not be tolerated.315 Spotify has instituted a

306.

See generally Sony Music Ent. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 426 F.Supp. 3d. 217 (4th Cir. 2019).
Sony Music Ent., 426 F.Supp. 3d. at 221.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 230 (quoting BMG Rights Management (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 311-312).
311. Id. at 230 (citing Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 503 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007). See generally
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 503 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “a computer system operator
can be held contributory liable if it has actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its
system . . . and can take simple measures to prevent further damage to copyrighted works . . . yet continues
provide access to infringing works.”).
312. Sony Music Ent., 426 F.Supp. 3d. at 231-232.
313. Id. at 232.
314. A PPLE , I NC ., A PPLE M EDIA TERMS AND C ONDITIONS , https://www.apple.com/legal/internetservices/itunes/us/terms.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2019) (explaining that you may not use the Services to plan
or engage in any illegal, fraudulent, or manipulative activity); Peoples, supra note 7 (explaining that Spotify’s
head of communications announced “new terms of service…prohibit selling accounts and playlists or “accepting
any compensation, financial or otherwise, to influence…the content included on an account or playlist).
315. A PPLE , I NC ., A PPLE M EDIA TERMS AND C ONDITIONS , https://www.apple.com/legal/internetservices/itunes/us/terms.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2019) (explaining that you may not use the Services to plan
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fraud detection department.316 However, what makes Cox relevant is that despite
Cox’s attempt to facilitate an intellectual property abuse department, Cox did not
implement their abuse prevention policies well enough to avoid potential
contributory liability. 317 It is time to apply these same standards to the digital music
streaming platforms, as despite the steps they have taken, these platforms still have
not addressed the fundamental forms of streaming fraud that have been around for
years.318 This fraud does not continue to be a problem because fraudsters find new
ways to manipulate the royalty pool and falsely induce monetary gain, although they
do.319 The same types of fraud from over five years ago are still significantly diluting
the royalty pool in the exact same way as it did five years ago.320 The digital music
platforms have not created any sufficient solution to combat early types of fraud, let
alone new fraud developments.321 Additionally, any user that has been deleted from
a digital platform can simply sign up as another user.322 Further, there are some
instances where some sources have alleged that infringing user accounts have not
been terminated in apparent violation of Spotify’s own user agreements.323 If this is
the case, and the users have not rectified their infringing behavior, Spotify may be
held contributory liable.324
C. What About Safe Harbor Provisions?
But, what about safe harbor protections under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (“DMCA”)?325 Is Spotify protected from contributory infringement claims by
the safe harbor protections of the DMCA?326 Because Spotify is a direct licensee of
or engage in any illegal, fraudulent, or manipulative activity); SPOTIFY, TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF USE (2019),
https://www.spotify.com/us/legal/end-user-agreement/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2020).
316. Wang, supra note 2; Hu, supra note 7.
317. See generally Sony Music Ent. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 426 F.Supp. 3d. 217 (4th Cir. 2019). See
generally BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 304-305 (4th Cir. 2018).
318. See generally Hu, supra note 7; see generally Ingham, supra note 9; see generally Yoo, supra note 59;
see generally Raymond, supra note 59; see generally Wang, supra note 2.
319. See generally Hu, supra note 7; see generally Arcand, supra note 117; see generally Ingham, supra note
9; see generally Yoo, supra note 59; see generally Raymond, supra note 59; see generally Wang, supra note 2;
see generally Ingham, supra note 101.
320. Clinch, supra note 11.
321. Leight, supra note 1; Hu, supra note 7; Nicolaou, supra note 194; Wang, supra note 2.
322. Ingham, supra note 101.
323. Hu, supra note 7.
324. With these accusations that Spotify was notified of infringing activity and the infringing activity remains
on the Spotify platform, it remains undisclosed whether Spotify received proper notification and whether that
notification was received by a proper party. If improper notification was received, Spotify may not be required
to takedown the infringing use if Spotify obtained proper licensing. See The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(c)(3) (1999).
325. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
326. Id.
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copyrighted works, Spotify may not qualify for protection under the DMCA.327 In
order to obtain DMCA protections, Spotify first must be considered an online service
provider within the definition of 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). 328 Under this definition, Spotify
could argue that it is an online service provider under a transitory communications
business.329 A transitory communication business is a business that provides
connections for its users.330 Spotify is a transitory communication business because
Spotify connects users to the Spotify music database without changing or modifying
the content of the music or any other material that is received by the rightsholders. 331
The DMCA safe harbor provisions332 were established to protect internet
companies from the massive piracy that occurs online.333 However, for a transitory
digital network to qualify under the safe harbor protections, the transitory digital
network is subject to the following conditions: (1) the data transmission was initiated
by or at the direction of a person other than the service provider; (2) the data
transmission . . . is carried out through an automated technical process without
selection of the material by the service provider; (3) the service provider does not
select the recipients of the material except as an automatic response to the request of
another person; (4) the intermediate or transit copies that are stored on the service
provider’s system must not be accessible other than to anticipated recipients, and
these copies must not be maintained on the system for longer than is necessary for
the transmission; and (5) the service provider must not have modified the content of
the transmitted data.334 Under these qualifications, Spotify does not fall under safe
harbor protections.335 First, and as previously mentioned, Spotify has its own
editorial playlists where, although mostly automated, have human intervention in the
selection process.336 Second, Spotify is directly knowledgeable about online music
piracy of its licensed works.337 Spotify is required to obtain a license for each and
every song distributed on its site, and it must therefore know with particularity about
each item of content on the site.338 Although the direct deals with labels may

327.

Clark, supra note 249.
17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
329. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A), Clark, supra note 249, at 307.
330. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A).
331. Clark, supra note 249, at 307.
332. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
333. Clark, supra note 249, at 311.
334. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1).
335. Clark, supra note 249, at 312; See 17 U.S.C. § 512(A)(1).
336. See generally Behind the Playlists: Your Questions Answered by Our Playlist Editors, S POTIFY,
https://artists.spotify.com/blog/behind-the-playlists-your-questions-answered-by-our-playlist-editors
(last
visited Dec. 5, 2020); Clark, supra note 249, at 312; Hogan, supra note 45; Owens, supra note 33.
337. Clark, supra note 249, at 312.
338. Coe Ramsey, Music Law 101: Common Music Licenses, DJ C OUNSEL. COM (Jul. 17, 2019),
http://www.djcounsel.com/music-law-101-common-music-licenses/; 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2018).
328.
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excusably fall under a safe harbor protection, the licenses required for music
publishers and songwriters under 17 U.S.C. § 115 may not. 339 It is Spotify’s statutory
obligation to obtain all § 115 licenses and one would be hard-pressed to excuse
Spotify under a safe harbor protection for a misrepresented composition when
platform algorithms can identify artist compositions by individual music tastes of
end users.340
D. Well, Litigation May Work When the Universe Aligns Just Right
There have also been instances where a fraudster releases unreleased material by
an artist under an account claiming to be said artist without artist or rightsholder
permissions.341 Because the material is posted without permission by any owner of
the copyrights, this action of the fraudster would be copyright infringement and the
fraudster could be subject to criminal penalty.342
According to the Copyright Office and the Copyright Act, “copyright
infringement occurs when a copyrighted work is reproduced, distributed, performed,
publicly displayed, or made into a derivative work without the permission of the
copyright owner.”343 The penalty for copyright infringement is either the actual
dollar amount of damages and profits or statutory damages ranging from $200 to
$150,000 for each work that was infringed. 344 Statutory damages are awarded based
upon evidence provided by the plaintiff in a copyright infringement lawsuit.345 In the
instance of a fraudster uploading copyrighted material without permission and that
has also not been released, it is likely that a jury would find a fraudster guilty of
copyright infringement, that is assuming the fraudster could be identified.346
After the onset of the Napster litigation,347 the RIAA filed 261 lawsuits against
individuals that illegally shared copyrighted music on the internet.348 These
individuals were targeted as a group that shared folders containing more than 1000
copyrights on file sharing platforms like KaZaa and allowed millions of users to
339.

See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512.
17 U.S.C. § 115; Clark Boyd, How Spotify Recommends Your New Favorite Artist, TOWARD D ATA
S CIENCE (Nov. 11, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/how-spotify-recommends-your-new-favorite-artist8c1850512af0.
341. Yoo, supra note 59.
342. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2008).
343. Definitions:
What
Is
Copyright
Infringement,
U.S.
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq-definitions.html (last visited on Jan. 1, 2020).
344. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2010).
345. Id.
346. Amy Harmon, The Price of Music: The Overview; 261 Lawsuits Filed on Music Sharing, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 9, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/09/business/the-price-of-music-the-overview-261-lawsuitsfiled-on-music-sharing.html?auth=login-email&login=email.
347. A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004.
348. Harmon, supra note 346; see Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (2012).
340.
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download those compositions illegally.349 The lawsuits were strictly to deter the
pattern of illegally traded copyrighted material and to change perceptual patterns that
the illegal trade could continue without punishment.350 As the 261 lawsuits were
filed, the RIAA also announced a ‘clean slate program.’351 The clean slate program
provided amnesty for any file sharer that turned themselves in before legal action
was taken against them.352 The lawsuits were nothing more than a tactic to prevent
behaviors of ongoing copyright infringement amongst the general public.353
In this instance of copyright infringement and where the fraudster could be
identified, such lawsuits could occur again and the courts could award a plaintiff
substantial statutory damages. These awards could once again act as a significant
deterrent from future fraudsters attempting the same type of music streaming fraud.
However, such cases would only be able to proceed on the extremely limited chance
that a rightsholder could identify a particular fraudster and show enough evidence to
substantiate that fraud existed. As previously mentioned throughout this comment,
this identification and evidence of fraud is almost impossible for rightsholders to
obtain.
VIII. INDUSTRY SOLUTIONS

A. User-Centric Royalty Models
Many industry commentators have suggested that moving away from the current
per stream royalty structure to a user-based model would help contain music
streaming fraud and playola practices.354 Deezer355 is expected to launch this userbased royalty model upon obtaining licenses with rightsholders. 356 In a user-based
model, the pro-rated royalty pool is based on a single individuals user’s account and
the streams of that individual user.357 If a particular user only streamed the songs of
one artist for the entirety of a month, all of the royalty pool revenue would be paid
349.

Harmon, supra note 346.
Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Ingham, supra note 9.
355. Deezer is an online music streaming service based in France. Deezer, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deezer (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
356. Althae Legaspi, Deezer Launches Initiative for ‘User-Centric’ Approach to Distribute Royalties: New
Website Emphasizes Potential Benefits of “User-Centric Payment System” Versus Market Share-Based Artist
Payments, R OLLING S TONE (Sept. 11, 2019, 10:13 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/musicnews/deezer-launches-initiative-for-user-centric-approach-to-distribute-royalties-883310/; see Stuart Dredge,
Deezer Still Pushing for User-Centric Payouts: ‘We Will Continue Fighting . . .’, MUSICALLY (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://musically.com/2020/10/01/deezer-still-pushing-for-user-centric-payouts-we-will-continue-fighting/.
357. Legaspi, supra note 356.
350.
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to the rightsholders associated with those streamed compositions. 358 The current
royalty model for subscription-based services bases royalties on all streams listened
throughout the entirety of the platform by all users.359 Under the user-centric model,
royalties would no longer be distributed based on an aggregate of all streams.360 This
method could be used to limit fraudulent activity to a particular user account, as a
particular fraudster’s royalty income would be limited to the individual fraudsters
account; in other words, when a fraudster sets up a user account to boost streams by
click fraud, the fraudster would never receive more royalty income than the fraudster
put in setting up that account as all royalty income would be based off of the activity
of that one account.361 A user-centric model will not allow for a fraudster to set up a
user account in the hopes to defraud the system.362 Currently, all user streams are
collectively accounted by using one royalty pool.363 In a user-centric model, the
royalty pool is refocused to individual users.364 So, if a fraudster sought to stream
songs in a manner to defraud the royalty pool, that royalty pool will be limited to that
individual user, so the fraudster could not gain any more income than was already
put into the account.365
However, there are many issues with this model and much criticism within the
industry regarding it. One particular criticism is that the user-centric royalty payout
would no longer provide a viable royalty model for all rightsholders. 366 In a Spotify
conducted study, Will Page, Spotify’s then Chief Economist, suggests that a digital
platform’s cost to switch from the current pro-rata royalty platform to a user-centric
royalty platform would result in higher administrative costs that would be deducted
from the overall royalty pool; therefore, decreasing the overall royalty distribution to
all rightsholders.367 Additionally, although a Finnish based user-centric model study
declares that a move to a user-centric model would decrease the overall royalties of
358. Stuart Dredge, Spotify “Bulgarian’ Scam Fuels Call from MMF for User-Centric Licensing Debate,
M USIC A LLY, (Feb. 22, 2018), https://musically.com/2018/02/22/mmf-calls-new-user-centric-licensing-debatespotify-bulgarian-scam/.
359. Tim Ingham, Spotify Still Pays Artists Out of One Big ‘Pot’. Should the Company Changes Its Policy?,
MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/spotify-still-pays-artistsout-of-one-big-pot-should-the-company-change-its-policy/.
360. Hu, supra note 7.
361. Chris Cooke, Deezer Steps Up Endorsement of User-Centric Approach to Digital Royalties, COMPLETE
MUSIC UPDATE (Sept. 11, 2019), https://completemusicupdate.com/article/deezer-steps-up-endorsement-ofuser-centric-approach-to-digital-royalties/; Ingham, supra note 13.
362. Hu, supra note 7; Dredge, supra note 358.
363. Ingham, supra note 13; Dredge, supra note 358.
364. Ingham, supra note 13; Dredge, supra note 358; Ingham, supra note 359.
365. Ingham, supra note 13; Ingham, supra note 359.
366. See generally Will Page & David Safir, Money In, Money Out: Lessons from CMOs in Allocating and
Distributing
License
Revenue,
O VUM
(Aug.
29,
2018),
http://serci.org/congress_documents/2018/money_in_money_out.pdf.
367. Id.; Ingham, supra note 359.
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the 0.4% top earning artists from 9.9% to 5.6% (with the remaining 4.3% allocated
to mid-tier artists and rightsholders), Page mentions that the Finnish study itself
acknowledges significant variations of these numbers of +/- 50% and the Finnish
study concluded that these fluctuations are not rare occurrences.368 With such
significant variations, it would be hard to determine, at this time, whether there is
any significant shift in royalty allocation that would favor lesser known artists in a
user-centric royalty model.369
Moreover, and in further criticism of the user-centric model, it is impossible to
predict the listening behavior of an average consumer to know whether any
significant shift in royalty allocation would occur using this model. 370 Such
unpredictability may occur in how an average listener is exposed to any given
artist.371 For instance, if most listeners depend on playlists to introduce them to new
music, fraud may become hugely impactful to a user-centric model. Most proponents
of a user-centric model claim that a move to this model will help to alleviate types
of fraud like the Bulgarian scam previously mentioned. 372 However, this model does
not account for the industry’s use of playola and alleged digital platform fraud to
boost streams and manipulate playlists.373 Many listeners rely on playlists to find new
music or as a convenient way to listen to music based on mood, which then exposes
the listener to new music.374 If industry insiders pay their way on to those playlists
or digital platforms manipulate those playlists to benefit themselves (or for any
reason), independent artists may lose access to those playlists which eliminates a
significant portion of potential royalty income for that independent artist and
associated rightsholders.375 Playlists help generate income by exposure.376 When one
person finds a composition from a playlist that they like, that person may add the

368.

Page, supra note 366.
Ingham, supra note 359.
370. See generally Will Page & David Safir, ‘User-Centric’ Revisited: The Unintended Consequences of
Royalty Distribution, O VUM, http://www.serci.org/congress_documents/2019/user_centric_revisited.pdf (last
visited Nov. 24, 2020); see generally Page & Safir, supra note 366; see generally Jari Muikku, Pro Rata and
User Centric Distribution Models: A Comparative Study, DIGITAL MEDIA FINLAND (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.fim-musicians.org/wp-content/uploads/prorata-vs-user-centric-models-study-2018.pdf (this study
repeatedly mention that the increases seen in the user-centric model are based on consumer listening behaviors.).
371. See generally Page & Safir, supra note 366; see generally Page & Safir, supra note 370; Paula Mejia,
The Success of Streaming Has Been Great for Some, but Is There a Better Way?, NPR (Jul. 22, 2019, 6:00AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/22/743775196/the-success-of-streaming-has-been-great-for-some-but-is-there-abetter-way.
372. See generally Dredge, supra note 358.
373. Stuart Dredge, How Would User-Centric Payouts Affect the Music Streaming World?, M USIC A LLY
(Mar. 2, 2018), https://musically.com/2018/03/02/user-centric-licensing-really-affect-streaming-payouts/.
374. See generally Peoples, supra note 36.
375. Leight, supra note 1; Pierce, supra note 32.
376. Peoples, supra note 16; Gensler & Christman, supra note 44.
369.
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composition to their own playlist. 377 This person’s addition can cause other followers
to do the same, exponentially increasing the market share of that composition.378 If
playola, or other forms of fraud, limits an artist’s playlist exposure, that artist may
never achieve enough activity to produce any significant royalty income under a
user-centric royalty model.379
B. Music Industry-Wide Policing Measures
There are multiple ways that the music industry and digital music platforms can
police fraud. First, the music industry can invest in stream-farm crackdowns.380 The
three major labels generated more than $13 billion in revenue in 2019.381 The labels
could commit to a specific level of financing to fund both an investigation of stream
farms and subsequent litigation against stream farm operators. 382 This has already
occurred in other countries. In 2018, the U.K.-based PPL, a performance music
licensing company, donated £1.5 million of member money towards fraud
prevention.383 This donated amount only represented 0.6% of the organization’s total
collections on behalf of labels and artists.384 SoundExchange, in the United States,
could provide similar funding with permission of their represented labels and
artists.385 The digital music platforms can provide a similar financial commitment to
develop more effective policing software and empower current anti-fraud
departments.386
Additionally, the digital music platforms could also commit to a specific level of
financing to help prevent fraudulent activities on their platforms in a more effective
manner than current implementations and further empower antifraud employment
teams.387 Currently, although the companies may have fraud detection departments,
the same types of fraud exist today that did over five years ago.388 With sufficient
377.

Peoples, supra note 16.
Id.
379. Id.; Leight, supra note 1; Pierce, supra note 32.
380. Ingham, supra note 13.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.;
see
generally
About
Us,
SOUNDEXCHANGE,
https://www.soundexchange.com/about/#:~:text=SoundExchange%20provides%20royalty%20solutions%20for
,and%20master%20rights%20owners’%20accounts (last visited Dec. 18, 2020); see generally What We Do, PPL,
https://www.ppluk.com/what-wedo/#:~:text=PPL%20is%20the%20UK’s%20music,in%20the%20UK%20since%201934. (last visited Dec. 18,
2020).
386. Ingham, supra note 13.
387. Id.
388. Id.; see generally Clinch, supra note 11.
378.
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investment, a service may be able to create more efficient fraud prevention software
while also building trust and good faith with content licensors.389
Companies can also hire third-party fraud detection services.390 Although this is a
relatively new service, there are companies that help prevent fraudulent activity.391
DistroKid,392 because of a strategic partnership with Audible Magic, can now
identify “extreme manipulations of rate, pitch and tempo” by using small audio
clips.393 Upon announcement of this partnership, DistroKid also announced the
release of a new, free resource to artists called DistroLock. 394 DistroLock is available
to any artist, not just DistroKid clients.395 The artist may use the system to upload
and register unreleased tracks to the service and have that track encoded with a
unique audio fingerprint. 396 DistroLock then encodes these audio tracks with an
audio fingerprint and uploads them to the Audible Magic registry.397 Audible Magic
then uses these audio fingerprints to block unauthorized music, such as previously
unreleased tracks, from appearing on streaming services.398
Rebeat399 is another service currently under development to help prevent
streaming fraud.400 Rebeat is a solution for labels to monitor and detect any irregular
streaming activity of label content.401 Rebeat analyzes an individual label or artist
statement from any of the digital music platforms and flags any irregularities in
data.402 For instance, the program identifies any irregular “spikes in data” and helps
determine if that spike was an error or attempted fraud. 403

389.

Ingham, supra note 13.
See Eggerton, supra note 254; Hu, supra note 7; see also Fraud Detection Software, R EBEAT, supra
note 262.
391. See Eggerton, supra note 254; Hu, supra note 7; see also Fraud Detection Software, R EBEAT, supra
note 262.
392. DistroKid is a digital distribution service that distributes the music of independent music artists to digital
music streaming platforms. DistroKid, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DistroKid (last visited Dec. 28,
2020).
393. Eggerton, supra note 254. Audible Magic is a content identification company that helps rightsholders
identify
and
protect
their
copyrighted
material.
Audible
Magic,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Audible_Magic (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
394. Eggerton, supra note 254.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Rebeat is a third-party service that is developing software to combat music streaming fraud on digital
music streaming platforms. R EBEAT, supra note 262.
400. Hu, supra note 7; see also REBEAT, supra note 262.
401. R EBEAT , supra note 262.
402. Id.
403. Id.
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C. Industry Penalties
The music industry and digital music services, in cooperation with companies like
Billboard that control music industry charts can enact instant chart penalties for
artists engaging in streaming fraud, as suggested by some industry journalists. 404 Any
party caught in fraudulent streaming activity would be subject to an automatic chart
penalty.405 Under this enforcement scheme, the chart position of a song or album
released by a violating party would be reduced by deducting the stream count by
some decided numeric value for a certain amount of releases. 406 The number of
releases that would be affected could be determined by the severity of the fraudulent
infraction or how many times the violating party has committed that infraction.407
This same penalty could also be determined by a predetermined number of releases
based on the type of infraction. 408 The impact of such a chart penalty could keep
some artists from reaching top charting position, deterring future fraudulent
streaming activities.409
Further, digital music service employees or music industry employees can be
penalized for any engagement in playola to manipulate music streaming playlists or
participate in any form of music streaming fraud.410 For instance, Sony released an
internal memorandum to all employees that stated that no employee is permitted to
engage in playola or any music streaming fraud.411 However, the internal memo
contained no direct penalties or consequences that would occur if any employee was
caught fraudulently boosting streams.412 Although this is an important step, it is not
enough as employees that may engage in playola or fraudulent music streaming
practices may not be deterred from the practice without possible ramifications for
their actions.413

404.
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406.
407.
408.
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IX. HOW CURRENT LEGISLATION CAN SERVE AS A BASIS FOR NEW MUSIC
STREAMING FRAUD LEGISLATION

A. Current Applicable Laws
Currently, there are two statutes that currently could be applied to music streaming
fraud: The Federal Trade Commission Act414 (“FTC Act”) that prevents actions of
fraud and deceptive practice, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 415 (“CFAA”)
that prevents fraud on the Internet.
The FTC Act416 prevents unfair and deceptive practices by persons, partnerships,
or corporations. 417 Unfair acts are those acts that will cause substantial injury to a
consumer that cannot be reasonably avoided by that consumer and is not outweighed
by any countervailing benefit or any other company that may be in competition with
the business causing the injury;418 and deceptive acts are acts by a business that
involve a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead a consumer.419
For instance, deception can occur when a particular business has actively tried to
conceal the truth about a particular product or service 420 or when a business does not
disclose information about a product or service that a reasonable person would expect
the business to disclose.421 The FTC Act422 also allows the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) to investigate reports of deceptive practices of a business.423
The FTC Act424 could be applied to both music streaming fraud and playola. If
companies like Spotify are diluting the royalty pool purposefully to decrease royalty
payouts, this could be cause for the FTC to initiate an investigation. 425 If the FTC
were to find the fraudulent streams to be a deceptive practice, penalties and
repercussions would follow and may help to diminish the practice. 426 Additionally,
through reports of fraud and investigations, the FTC could find that companies like

414.

See generally The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1914).
See generally The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1984).
416. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
417. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
418. Federal
Trade
Commission
Act
or
Practices,
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RESERVE,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/ftca.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).
419. The Federal Trade Commission: Deceptive Practices Affecting Consumers, JUSTIA,
https://www.justia.com/consumer/enforcing-your-rights-as-a-consumer/the-federal-trade-commission/
(last
visited Jan. 1, 2020).
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
423. Id.
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426. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
415.

426

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Smith-Burton (Do Not Delete)

8/10/2021 10:03 PM

CHRISTINE SMITH BURTON
Spotify are aware of fraudulent activity and do not perform due diligence in
monitoring fraudulent activity by third parties.427
Furthermore, the FTC could perform an investigation, as they did with payola, to
find whether the music industry or the digital music platforms themselves are
offering money (or any other form of payment) to curators to have their songs placed
on influential playlists, or any playlists at all. 428 Although playola is not illegal as
payola is,429 this practice could nevertheless be considered misleading to the
consumer.430 If the playlists are not based on the choice of the consumer through
consumers’ overall listening patterns but are manipulated by a fraudulent party, the
fraudulent party is forcing the consumer to listen to products they would not normally
listen to and prevents the playlist from being one that is based on a song’s popularity
due to consumer preference.431
The CFAA432 may also be used to prevent further acts of music streaming fraud.433
Because music streaming is currently being undermined by the use of bots to rack up
royalty streams and increase royalty payouts, any ligating party may be able to file
suit under § 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA against any party committing or that has
committed music streaming fraud.434 Although application would require a broader
reading of the statute, this Section considers it a crime to “knowingly, and with the
intent to defraud, access[] a protected computer without authorization, or exceed[]
authorized access . . . and obtain anything of value.”435 The phrase “obtain anything
of value” includes obtaining subscribers, and Courts could easily interpret the law to
apply to increased streams, which in turn increases royalty payouts, to be something
of value.436
The judicial interpretation of the Statute and whether that interpretation can be
broadly applied is split between the judicial circuits.437 The broader interpretation, as
would be required in instances of music streaming fraud, could only apply in those

427. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b); See generally Report Fraud to the FTC, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/faq/consumer-protection/submit-consumer-complaint-ftc (last visited Dec. 18, 2020).
428. See generally Seagrave, supra note 136, at 94-100.
429. Payola is only illegal if “sponsorship” of a composition on a particular broadcast playlist is not revealed
to the listening public. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1960).
430. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
431. Id.
432. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
433. See generally Rohan Parekh, Applying Broader Interpretations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Could Help Curb Fraudulent Plays on Music Streaming Platforms, J. OF GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. (Jun. 11,
2018), http://www.jgspl.org/applying-broader-interpretations-of-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-could-helpcurb-fraudulent-plays-on-music-streaming-platforms/.
434. Id.; see also Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (1986).
435. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
436. Parekh, supra note 433.
437. Id.
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circuits where the court has determined that the terms of service are subject to the
CFAA.438 Currently, the First and the Fifth Circuits are the only Circuits that interpret
the CFAA as applicable to a violation of terms of use to control the scope of
authorization.439 These Circuits have supported this broader interpretation of the
Statute within the legislative history of the CFAA440 that suggests that the law be
responsive to changes in technology and increased hacker sophistication. 441 These
Circuit Courts have interpreted this history to apply to changes of the scope of
authorization as technology develops.442 With this knowledge of the legislative
history and the already adopted broader interpretation of the First and Fifth Circuits,
other Circuits should adopt the broader interpretation in order to prevent the
devaluation of online agreements and terms of service.443 Additionally, by providing
a broader interpretation of the statute, the CFAA could apply a criminal liability as a
potential deterrent of future fraudulent music streaming activity.444
B. Legislative Action
The FTC Act and the CFAA might help address some aspects of fraud, but a
comprehensive statutory scheme is required to effectively combat all aspects of
playola and music streaming fraud. At this point, legislative action to prevent playola
is necessary and the only real means to combat playola, if an effective statute could
be passed. As explained in supra Sections IV and VII, playola prohibits some
companies from participating in the market on an equal footing, and these companies
cannot successfully sue because of their inability to prove the fraudulent activity in
court.445 However, and as previously mentioned in supra Section IV, 446 every artist
and rightsholder deserves the right to fair competition in the marketplace, and every
music consumer deserves the chance to discover and enjoy the best music. Playola

438.

Id.
Parekh, supra note 433 (citing United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that
“authorized access” or “authorized” encompasses limits placed on the use of information obtained through
permitted access to a computer system and data available on that system)). The author further states that “in
contrast, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Nosal that criminal prosecution under the CFAA’s “exceeding
authorized access” provisions could not be based on violating contractual “use” restrictions but must be linked
to contractual or technological “access” restrictions.”); see also EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, 274 F.3d
577. 582 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding terms of use and access restrictions control the scope of “authorization.”)).
440. Parekh, supra note 433 (citing S. Rep. No. 140-357, at 11 (1996) (discussing how the CFAA
amendments reflect the importance of the new ways hackers manipulate technologies)).
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. See supra Section VIII; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
446. See supra Section IV.
439.
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practices not only distort the marketplace but suppress listener choice. A
comprehensive statutory solution is required.
Congressional action is required to remedy the growing problem of fraud in the
music industry. As in the early days of payola, Congress will need to launch an
investigation or hearings into the possibility of and speculations regarding playola.
Based upon this information, Congress must establish a law that specifically states
that playola is an illegal practice. Multiple laws establish precedent guiding the form
of an anti-playola law: the Payola clause of the Federal Communications Act
(“FCA”),447 the FTC Act,448 and CFAA.449
The FCA’s payola provisions450 could serve as legislative precedent in favor of
anti-playola laws. The practice of payola and playola are strikingly similar, but the
current payola laws only apply to radio broadcasts.451 The FCA has no applicability
to music streaming and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has no
authority over fraudulent activity of interactive music streaming.452 But, because the
practices and outcome are similar, Congress could easily make the connection and
create a statute to protect the consumer from fraudulent activity on music streaming
playlists.453
The FTC Act454 was passed into law to prevent deceptive acts on consumers
and unfair business methods of competition in the marketplace, and a similar law
could guide an anti-playola law.455 Digital music streaming fraud is deceptive to the
consumer because the consumer, when listening to a particular playlist, no longer has
a real choice in the compositions that are placed on that playlist as those playlists are

447.

See generally Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 317, 508 (1934).
15 U.S.C. § 45.
449. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
450. See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 508.
451. Id.
452. Cookson, supra note 33.
453. In September of 2019, the FCC Commissioner sent a letter to the RIAA requiring the RIAA to investigate
payola allegations. The letter followed a Rolling Stone article stating that payola still exists in the form record
labels and artists using independent promoters for radio playlist promoters. Interestingly, the article points to DJs
and radio programmers using other station playlists as radio stations are more reluctant to add a song that is not
being played by any other stations. DJs and radio programmers have also been known to use top music streaming
playlists to determine their own radio broadcasting playlists. If a music streaming playlist is influenced by
playola, this could also force radio programming manipulation. If the RIAA were to uncover any payola through
the use of playola, this discovery could instigate further fraud investigations into record labels and digital music
services for fraudulent activity if the FCC provided this information to the FTC or DOJ. See Leight, supra note
181; Peoples, supra note 7.
454. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
455. Federal Trade Commission: History, ALLGOV, http://www.allgov.com/departments/independentagencies/federal-trade-commission-ftc?agencyid=7429 (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).
448.
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influenced by fraud and not by listening preferences or popularity.456 Unfair methods
of competition affect the market when a fraudster, or multiple fraudsters, autogenerate tracks in order to manipulate illegitimate financial gains at the detriment of
the legitimate rightsholders.457 Because of the uniqueness of the types of fraud,
deceptive acts and unfair methods of competition in the music streaming market,
Congress should tailor a new anti-playola statute to directly address the music
streaming industry.
Last, Congress could use the CFAA458 to further establish precedent in favor of
an anti-playola statute. The CFAA459 was enacted by Congress in order to prevent
hackers from accessing servers without authorization for substantial gain.460
However, as previously stated, the statute only protects the service platforms and not
the rightsholders directly.461 The CFAA462 may only protect the digital music
services in the First and Fifth Circuits as applied to digital music streaming fraud. 463
But, Congress wished for the CFAA464 to be responsive to changes in technology and
hacker sophistication.465 Unfortunately, most judicial circuits have applied the
CFAA466 very narrowly even when applied to just the digital music services.467
However, Congress could further incorporate the elements from the CFAA468 into an
anti-playola statute, narrowly tailoring aspects of fraud specific to the music
streaming industry and its effects on both digital music streaming services and
rightsholders.469
Currently, playola is not illegal in the United States. Despite years of
speculation and unnamed sources affirming its prevalence, Congress has not initiated
any formal investigation into the matter. Playola seems to be following the same
direction that payola did, where Congress did not address the issue of payola until
payola’s impact on the consumer and business competition could no longer be

456. Hu, supra note 45; See generally Peoples, supra note 7; Peoples, supra note 16; Leight, supra note 1;
Raymond, supra note 59.
457. Vonn, supra note 80.
458. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
459. Id.
460. See generally Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act?, WIRED (Nov.
18, 205, 6:38 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/hacker-lexicon-computer-fraud-abuse-act/.
461. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
462. Id.
463. Parekh, supra note 433.
464. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
465. Parekh, supra note 433.
466. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
467. Parekh, supra note 433 (citing S. Rep. No. 140-357, at 11 (1996) (discussing how the CFAA
amendments reflect the importance of the new ways hackers manipulate technologies).
468. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
469. Parekh, supra note 433.
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ignored.470 However, despite Congress’ efforts, illegal payola is still present in the
broadcasting industry.471 Although payola and playola practices are similar, the
payola statute should only act as a “jumping off” point towards a more effective tool
to prevent playola practices.472 Additionally, Congress should examine the old
payola statute to form a basis for an anti-playola statute, but realize, as was the case
with payola, the same parties that may influence the drafting of the statute may also
be the same parties benefiting from playola and because of this, without careful
monitoring, an ineffective statute could be drafted.473
Although the practice of payola and playola are strikingly similar, any playola
laws will need to be applied in a more effective manner than the current payola laws.
The ineffectiveness of the current payola laws are well-known throughout the
industry.474 After the payola law became law, the music and radio industry continued
to find relatively simple ways to avoid detection of payola practices;475 for example,
many labels began to use independent promoters.476 Even when the 2005 settlement
agreements forbade the transfer of payola to independent promoters, the labels and
independent promoters found more sophisticated versions of radio playlist
manipulation.477 If a similar statutory provision is applied to playola, the same
avoidance processes may occur with music streaming playlist playola. 478 Congress
should take care to draft a more rigorous anti-playola statute.
X. A PROPOSED SOLUTION

A possible solution to combat music streaming fraud is to establish the Copyright
Office as an independent federal agency.479 Currently, the Copyright Office is a
separate department of the Library of Congress and all rules and regulations created

470.

See generally Seagrave, supra note 136, at 95.
Leight, supra note 178.
472. Id.; Peoples, supra note 7.
473. Owens, supra note 33.
474. Messitte, How Payola Laws Keep Independent Artists Off Mainstream Radio, F ORBES (Nov. 30, 2014,
10:25 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nickmessitte/2014/11/30/how-payola-laws-keep-independent-artistsoff-mainstream-radio/?sh=5bba38f8519f.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Peoples, supra note 7.
479. It is important for the Copyright Office to become an independent agency because the Copyright Office
advices Congress on both domestic and international copyright matters and needs to remain impartial. The U.S.
Copyright Office: Its Functions and Resources: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary House of
Representatives, 114th Cong. 113-16 (2015) (testimony of Maria Pallante, Registrar of Copyrights).
471.
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by the Copyright Office must be approved by the Librarian of Congress.480 However,
as an independent federal agency, the Copyright Office could be authorized to
establish rules, adjudicate and investigate various copyright issues including music
streaming fraud.481 These various authorities can be limited by Congress, as
necessary, but can specifically deal with the nuances that arise in the market as
technology develops.
There are various justifications for a federal agency to establish regulations on a
particular market.482 First, although this country has a private market system, the
markets can become subject to flawed business practice that may damage the market;
an independent agency can remedy such flaws, like market manipulation and unfair
trade practices, with regulation.483 Second, an unregulated market can negatively
impact consumers even if businesses within that market establish economically
viable and efficient systems.484 Lastly, regulations by agencies conform the market
principles of business to social values that protect the public interest.485 These values
include, but are not limited to, basic principles of fairness and equity.486 In the case
of music streaming fraud, a Copyright Office, as a regulatory agency, could mitigate
the imperfection of music streaming fraud on the digital music platforms as it affects
rightsholders. As previously mentioned, various instances of music streaming fraud
may affect the placement of a composition on a playlist, in turn, impacting not just
royalty payouts, but what song is placed in front of the consumer. These regulations
impact the fairness and equity of the market in royalty distributions and fairness in
consumer choice.
Throughout the history of the United States, Congress has granted independent
agencies regulatory, adjudicatory and investigatory abilities. 487 For example, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was created to inform and protect

480. Overview
of
the
Copyright
Office,
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
https://www.copyright.gov/about/#:~:text=Copyright%20functions%20were%20first%20centralized,created%2
0by%20Congress%20in%201897 (last visited Dec. 28, 2020); 17 U.S.C. § 701(a).
481. See Types of Administrative Agency Action, USLEGAL, https://administrativelaw.uslegal.com/threetypes-of-administrative-agency-action-rulemaking-adjudication-investigation/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).
482. See
Independent
Agencies
of
the
United
States
Government,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_agencies_of_the_United_States_government (last visited Jan. 23,
2020).
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Franita Tolson, Fairness Demands the Protection of the Administrative State, THE HILL (Apr. 2, 2018,
2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/381200-fairness-demands-the-protection-of-the-administrativestate.
486. Id.; see also The Basics of Administrative Law, THE LAW OFFICES OF STIMMEL, STIMMEL & ROESER,
https://www.stimmel-law.com/en/articles/basics-administrative-law (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).
487. See Types of Administrative Agency Action, USLEGAL, https://administrativelaw.uslegal.com/threetypes-of-administrative-agency-action-rulemaking-adjudication-investigation/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).
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investors, maintain fair and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. 488 The
SEC has an enforcement division that investigates potential violations of the
securities laws and recommends whether the Commission should bring any civil
action in federal court or before administrative law judges. 489 The enforcement
division obtains evidence of possible violations through surveillance activities,
investor tips and complaints, other divisions and offices of the SEC, self-regulatory
organization and other security industry sources, and media reports. 490 As the SEC
has regulatory, adjudicatory, and investigatory abilities, the same or similar powers
can be granted to the independent agency of the Copyright Office. Congress may not
give the Copyright Office the same expansive powers of the SEC, but the Copyright
Office can have various limited regulatory, adjudicatory, and investigatory powers
and work in conjunction with already established agencies such as the FTC and the
DOJ.
Establishing the Copyright Office as an independent agency is not a new proposal.
In 2017, a bill of this nature was introduced by Representatives Tom Marino (R-PA)
and Judy Chu (D-CA) and called the Copyright Office for the Digital Economy
Act.491 The bill would have established the Copyright Office as an independent
agency and would have made the Register of Copyrights a presidentially appointed
position.492 Unfortunately, this bill never went before a vote and died in the 115th
Congress.493 However, the Copyright Office’s establishment as an independent
agency may still prove necessary to combat music streaming fraud and should be
reintroduced with various changes.
In the 2017 bill, the regulatory functions of the Copyright Office were limited to
the copyright registration process.494 In a new introduction of the bill, the Copyright
Office should be granted the regulatory ability to combat music streaming fraud as
music streaming fraud impacts the overall economic conditions of rightsholders. As
mentioned throughout this comment, music streaming fraud hurts the royalty
distributions of all rightsholders as well as hurts the consuming public. This
independent agency could create a regulation for digital music platforms, such as
Spotify, to report any instance of fraud caught by the service. The Copyright Office
would be free to establish a committee that analyzes these reports of fraud.
488. The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/rolesec#:~:text=The%20U.%20S.%20Securities%20and%20Exchange,Facilitate%20capital%20formation
(last
visited Dec. 28, 2020).
489. How
Investigations
Work,
U.S.
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/enforce/how-investigations-work.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
490. Id.
491. The Copyright Office for the Digital Economy Act, H.R. 890, 115th Cong (2017).
492. Id.
493. H.R. 890 (115th): Copyright Office for the Digital Economy Act, GOVTRAK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr890 (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
494. See generally H.R. 890.
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This committee can also be established to investigate reports of fraud from people
in the music industry as well as consumers. In this situation, those with evidence of
potential fraud could report these activities to the enforcement division of the
Copyright Office. Additionally, the Copyright Office could use substantiated media
reports to launch investigations. If fraud were determined, the Copyright Office
could submit the investigation’s findings to the FTC or DOJ for further investigation
and prosecution. However, as the fraud impacts the royalty distribution of various
rights holders, the investigation can be turned over to the Copyright Royalty Board
for further determination on rates and rate regulations of the market.
The Copyright Royalty Board, under 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1)(F), must establish
“rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been
negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller.” In these
determination of rates, the judges of the Copyright Royalty Board must consider and
“base their decision on economic, competitive, and programming information
presented by the parties,” including: (i) whether the use of a digital music service’s
platform may substitute for or promote sales of a particular song or whether that use
may otherwise interfere with or enhance a rightsholder’s other song revenue streams;
and (ii) the relative roles of the rightsholder and the digital music service in a song
and “the service made available to the public with respect to the relative creative
contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost and risk.”495
Fraudulent streams on a digital music platform would severely interfere and impact
a rightsholder’s revenues from its song as well as may decrease overall market share
of royalty distributions. When an investigation finds fraud has impacted the royalty
pool, this fraud limits creative works made available to the public, dramatically
impacts fair returns of a rightsholder’s creative work under existing economic
conditions and has a disruptive impact on the structure of the industry and
competition. Additionally, fraud that disrupts the royalty pool may severely impact
creative contributions to the market. If copyright owners cannot make a fair income
in the market due to fraud, creatives may cease creating to find a fair income, or
living wage, in other industries. One of the Copyright Royalty Board’s functions is
to determine fair rates while considering economic conditions and the impacts of
fraud on the market may severely impact these economic conditions. 496 In cases of
fraud, the Copyright Royalty Board may utilize its power to determine how the rate
structure needs to be altered to account for the impact of fraud on the royalty pool. 497
For instance, the Copyright Royalty Board could require a recalculation of the
royalty pool that excludes fraudulent streams and a redistribution of royalties based
on this recalculation to rightsholders. In turn, this recalculation requirement could
force the digital music streaming services to create more effective policing measures
495.
496.
497.
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to combat fraudulent practices on their sites. If an investigation found that the digital
music service manipulated streams or participated in fraudulent practices to force
lower royalty payouts to rightsholders, the Copyright Royalty Board 498 could
determine a penalty percentage on royalty payouts.
The Copyright Office is best established as an independent agency to combat
music streaming fraud. Under this establishment, the Copyright Office could regulate
and investigate instances of potential fraud and based on the expertise of the
department, best determine the appropriate steps when instances of music streaming
fraud arise.
XI. CONCLUSION

As mentioned throughout this comment, there are many types of fraud affecting
the music streaming marketplace. Third party fraudsters, rightsholders, artists and
digital music platforms have all been accused of some form of playola or fraudulent
practice. If the accusations of playola and the fraudulent acts of the digital music
streaming platforms are true, the industry itself is left without an objective party that
could determine an effective solution for the prevention of fraud on music streaming
platforms without implicating themselves. Because a solution for music streaming
fraud requires an unbiased determination of prevention, Congressional intervention
and legislation is required.
One possible solution is for Congress to initiate investigations and enact a statute
that prevents and deters music streaming fraud. There are currently already
established laws that serve as a possible starting point and show legislative history
in the prevention of fraudulent activity in various markets including the anti-payola
statute, FTC Act, and the CFAA. However, as seen with the anti-payola statute, a
statute may only serve as words on paper as the industry and various would-be
fraudsters find new practices to circumvent the language of the statute.
A better possible Congressional solution to combat music streaming fraud is to
establish the Copyright Office as an independent federal agency. With this action,
the Copyright Office could be empowered to impose regulations on the industry that
are specifically formulated to extinguish music streaming fraud and playola.
Additionally, the Copyright Office could form an investigatory committee that would
require digital music platforms to report any indications of fraud as well as
investigate any reports of fraud by the music industry and consumers. The Copyright
Office as a regulatory agency may be best equipped to identify, investigate, and
prevent music streaming fraud.

498. Currently, the Copyright Royalty Board is appointed by the Librarian of Congress after consultation
with the Register of Copyrights. As an independent agency, the Copyright Royalty Board would be appointed by
the Register of Copyrights. The Copyright Royalty Board would move under the new independent agency
structure and would no longer fall under the constructs of the Library of Congress. See 17 U.S.C. § 801(a).
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